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ABSTRACT
Courts increasingly use actuarial—meaning statistically derived—
information about a defendant’s likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior in
the future at sentencing. This Article examines how developers construct the
tools that predict recidivism risk. It exposes the numerous choices that
developers make during tool construction with serious consequences to
sentencing law and policy. These design decisions require normative
judgments concerning accuracy, equality, and the purpose of punishment.
Whether and how to address these concerns reflects societal values about the
administration of criminal justice more broadly. Currently, developers make
these choices in the absence of law, even as they face distinct interests that
diverge from the public. As a result, the information produced by these tools
threatens core values at sentencing. This Article calls for accountability
measures at various stages in the development process to ensure that the
resulting risk estimates reflect the values of the jurisdictions where the tools
will be applied at sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION
Predictive technologies increasingly appear at every stage of the criminal
justice process.1 From predictive policing to pretrial bail to sentencing, public
and private entities outside the justice system now construct policy-laden
evidence of recidivism risk to facilitate the administration of justice.2 Using the
actuarial risk tools for sentencing as illustration, this Article examines the
normative judgments entailed in the development of predictive recidivism risk
information for the administration of justice. It proposes measures to infuse
public input into tool construction.
Criminal courts increasingly engage in “risk-based sentencing” as states
consider and adopt more data-driven criminal justice reforms.3 Risk-based
sentencing occurs when a court relies on actuarial risk assessment tools that
predict a defendant’s likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior to inform and

1 Predictive technologies are spreading through the criminal justice system like wildfire. See, e.g.,
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2015)
(explaining predictive policing and Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion determinations); Cecelia
Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 564–67
(2015) (explaining risk assessments for probation and parole hearings); Sandra G. Mayson, Bail Reform and
Restraint for Dangerousness: Are Defendants a Special Case?, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing
risk assessments at pretrial bail hearings); Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion
Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016) (explaining program-predicted
criminal activity and Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion determinations); Sonja B. Starr, EvidenceBased Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014)
(discussing risk assessments at sentencing). See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION:
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (discussing dilemmas of prediction in
various stages of criminal process).
2 See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.
org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (describing leading risk assessment tools for
sentencing and corrections developed by Northpointe); Ellen Huet, Server and Protect: Predictive Policing
Firm PredPol Promises to Map Crime Before It Happens, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/02/11/predpol-predictive-policing (discussing the leading predictive policing
software PredPol); Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD
FOUNDATION (2016), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.
pdf (describing a risk tool for pretrial bail hearings developed by a nonprofit foundation).
3 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 1; Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-newscience-of-sentencing. Scholars and policymakers often refer to this practice as “evidence-based” sentencing
because it is part of a larger shift towards “evidence-based” practices in criminal justice. See Klingele, supra
note 1. This Article will not use that phrase because it is misleading in this context, as courts already use
evidence to determine a sentence. See infra Part I. This practice is new in the sense that courts use actuarial
risk information. Thus, this Article refers to the practice as “risk-based sentencing.” Cf. Melissa Hamilton,
Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2015).
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guide its discretion in sentencing.4 These actuarial—meaning statistically
derived—tools assess individuals based on a series of factors to produce a
score that ranks defendants according to likelihood of engaging in specified
behavior in the future.5 Judges may consider the information provided by
recidivism risk tools directly in the sentencing process, or probation officers
may confront the tools and collapse the information into a presentence
recommendation to the court.6 This information may influence any number of
sentencing determinations, including whether to impose probation versus
incarceration, the length of incarceration, and the types of conditions a judge
may impose on probation.7
A growing body of scholarship considers the entry of risk-based sentencing
practices in the states. Scholars debate the use of actuarial risk information at
sentencing for very different reasons. Advocates contend that, because risk
tools more objectively and consistently predict the likelihood of recidivism
than the inevitable human guesswork of judges,8 using the tools at sentencing
will improve accuracy.9 More accuracy, they suggest, will improve sentencing
practices.10 Critics oppose risk-based sentencing as a matter of fairness. They
contend that, because risk tools rely on factors like gender or proxies for race,
using the tools at sentencing is impermissible as a matter of constitutionality or

4

John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assessment in Criminal
Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 158, 159 (2014); Starr, supra note 1, at 805.
5 See, e.g., John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 405–06 (2006).
6 Monahan & Skeem, supra note 4, at 159.
7 See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 493–94 (2016) (discussing length of sentence, diversion, and interventions); PAMELA
M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT
INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM A NATIONAL WORKING GROUP 8–10 (2011),
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/RNA%20Guide%20Final.ashx (focusing on diversion from
prison to probation).
8 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557–58 (2015) (discussing the “judicial assessment of
risk”); Monahan, supra note 5, at 427–28 (discussing the accuracy of such tools).
9 See, e.g., Jordan Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk
Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 713 (2011) (“The
ability to generate accurate assessments that can be systematically used in the sentencing courtroom will
represent an improvement over current practices.”).
10 See, e.g., NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2015) (“Assessment instruments might help increase the efficiency of the justice system by
identifying low-risk offenders who could be effectively managed on probation rather than incarcerated, and
they might help identify high-risk offenders who would gain the most by being placed in rehabilitative
programs.”).
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bad policy.11 This scholarship influences larger debates about whether and how
to incorporate predictive risk information into the administration of justice.12
Yet none of these scholars consider how to regulate the production of risk
information. Instead, they debate whether to eliminate its use entirely.
Outside the sentencing context, a growing body of scholarship examines
the rise of predictive analytics used both within the criminal justice system13
and outside of it.14 These scholars largely call for accountability measures that
ensure predictions are consistent with normative concepts of fairness.15 Yet
few of these scholars engage with the underlying normative debates implicit in
the construction of the tools. Few urge elimination of the tools all together.16
This Article enters at the intersection of these two bodies of scholarship. It
exposes how external incentives intersect with law and policy in the
construction of risk tools for sentencing. How tools are constructed has great
import to the “truths” the resulting outcomes purport to assert. Using actuarial
risk tools used for sentencing as illustration, this Article does two things. First,
it systematically exposes the normative judgments embedded in actuarial risk
assessment tools’ construction. Second, it calls for legal accountability to

11 See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 3–6. For constitutional debate, compare J.C. Oleson, Risk in
Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329 (2011)
(arguing that risk-based sentencing practices are constitutional), with Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball
Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671 (2015) (arguing that risk-based sentencing practices are unconstitutional), and
Starr, supra note 1 (arguing that risk-based sentencing is unconstitutional). For normative debate, compare
Hyatt et al., supra note 9 (arguing that using risk-based sentencing practices instills fairness into the criminal
justice process), with Hamilton, supra note 3 (arguing that risk-based sentencing practices are prejudicial and
unreliable), and Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED.
SENT’G REP. 237 (2015) (arguing that risk-assessment tools aggravate racial disparity in the criminal justice
system).
12 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017).
13 See, e.g., ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA (2015) (examining
the risks of DNA testing used in criminal trials); Ferguson, supra note 12 (discussing predictive technologies
and realities unique to the criminal justice system); Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False
Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 723 (2007) (discussing
new forensic techniques introduced at various stages of the criminal justice process).
14 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671
(2016) (discussing unintended discriminatory effects of data mining); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven
Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017) (describing the use of data analytic tools in the
workplace).
15 See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014).
16 But see HARCOURT, supra note 1; Harcourt, supra note 11.
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ensure risk-tool construction in service of the law.17 Actuarial risk assessment
tools obscure difficult normative choices about the administration of criminal
justice. This Article proposes a framework to pierce the opacity of these tools
with various interventions to facilitate public discourse and input throughout
the construction process.
Entities developing actuarial risk assessment tools for sentencing make
policy assumptions during construction that relate to highly contested and
undecided questions of sentencing law and policy. Part I unpacks the toolconstruction process to demonstrate what decisions tool developers make and
when. It divides this process into two stages, each of which implicates
normative judgments about sentencing law and policy in different ways.
During the first stage, researchers decide what data to collect, where to collect
data from, how to define recidivism, and what predictive factors to observe in
the data set.18 They also create an algorithm to reflect their conclusions about
recidivism risk.19 These decisions tie into legal questions about what counts at
sentencing and how these factors should be weighted.
The second stage occurs when entities decide how to convey the
algorithm’s results for use by criminal justice actors.20 Public and private
entities translate the algorithmic outcomes into recidivism risk categories.
These decisions implicate policy questions about who should be considered a
risk and how much risk society tolerates. Combined, this examination
demonstrates that actuarial risk tools, while “scientific” in the sense that
developers use technology to assess risk, reflect normative judgments familiar
to sentencing law and policy debates.21 Yet, unlike previous efforts to infuse
prediction into sentencing, it is difficult to identify the normative judgments
reflected in the information produced by the tools.

17 See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1723, 1730 (2015) (calling for a shift from inquiries about validation of scientific claims to a more normative
concept of “serviceable truth”). Understanding risk technology as a “serviceable truth” requires striking the
balance between “scientific facts and reasons on the one hand and the nurture and protection of human lives
and flourishing on the other,” and recognizing that “science’s role in the legal process is not simply, even
preeminently, to provide a mirror of nature. Rather it is to be of service to those who come to the law with
justice or welfare claims whose resolution happens to call for scientific fact-finding.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
18 See infra Sections I.A.1–3.
19 See infra Section I.A.4.
20 See infra Section I.B.
21 See infra Part I; see also Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos:
Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1896 (2003) (stating that
“risk is a social construct” and not an exact science).
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Part II explores the significance of construction choices with respect to
three normative and deeply contested societal values central to sentencing law
and policy and the administration of criminal justice more broadly.
Section II.A considers tool construction and the notion of accuracy. Scientific
studies may demonstrate that a tool is “accurate” because it differentiates
between defendants who do or do not engage in specific behavior in the future
more consistently than chance or it classifies a defendant who engages in
particular behavior in the future as high risk versus identifying a defendant
who commits no future crime as low risk.22 Both of these types of accuracy
relate to the overarching aims of the justice system, but neither assessment
provides insight as to whether a tool credibly meets those aims. Entities
developing risk tools cannot answer these questions through empirical
assessment; only society can make that determination.23
Section II.B considers how tool-construction choices compromise equality
at sentencing. Risk tools inevitably classify defendants from historically
disadvantaged backgrounds—particularly black men—as higher risk than other
defendants due to construction decisions.24 As a result, certain defendants will
not have equal opportunity to benefits that may flow from the introduction of
risk tools at sentencing. Whether and how much to compromise this value is a
matter that society should address before tool adoption. The final value
considered in section II.C relates to the purpose of punishment. Information
about a defendant’s likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior in the future
may further utilitarian purposes of punishment depending on how it is
developed.25 Society should decide whether and how to incorporate this
information into sentencing practices.26
The exploration in sections II.A–C demonstrates that the construction of a
recidivism risk tool is coterminous with the law’s normative concerns and
institutional practices. Yet the entities developing risk tools often decide these
difficult questions without guidance from law or policymakers. This is true
despite the unique set of interests that tool developers’ face when constructing

22 See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 24 (explaining that risk tool accuracy is often represented through
predictive validity studies).
23 See infra Section II.A.
24 See infra Section II.B.
25 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121 (2005)
(urging consequentialism over retributivism as the guiding purpose of punishment at sentencing).
26 See infra Section II.C.
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a risk tool.27 Section II.D also demonstrates how the desire for cheap, varied,
and easily accessible data incentivizes developers to make construction choices
that may contradict or conflict with a state’s existing sentencing policies and
practices.
Part III provides a path forward. It calls for democratic engagement with
the construction of actuarial risk tools. Whether and how a risk assessment tool
predicts recidivism in the administration of criminal justice requires
accountability to the normative values of the community where a tool is
applied. While scholars largely discuss accountability in scientific terms,28
section III.A explores a separate meaning of the term that builds from the
realities of applying the tool’s outcomes at sentencing. Accountability in this
context requires removing the veil of objectivity to facilitate community
engagement with the normative judgments underlying tool construction.29
Section III.B calls on tool developers and government actors to facilitate this
democratic accountability in the construction of risk. It identifies three levels
of opacity that prevent meaningful engagement, and suggests various
interventions to infuse criminal justice expertise and political process
accountability into the tool-construction process. These reforms heed the
essence of calls for caution in automated systems; namely, that tools should
reflect societal values and ensure democratic input in construction.30
This Article provides two novel contributions to existing literature. First, it
sharpens theoretical critiques about using risk tools at sentencing and broadens
the scope of the ongoing normative debate about whether states should adopt
risk-based sentencing practices.31 Although the public is exposed to the
scholarly debate on risk-based sentencing,32 its voice is largely absent
27

See infra Section II.D.
See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017) (discussing
computer science accountability). But see Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023
(2017) (discussing accountability as a matter of both democratic and computer science significance).
29 As Sheila Jasanoff explains, “objectivity itself is better understood not as an intrinsic attribute of
science but as a perceived characteristic of scientific knowledge, arrived at through culturally conditioned
practices.” Jasanoff, supra note 17, at 1739–40. Similarly, the perceived objectivity of technology used to
produce recidivism risk knowledge for sentencing is constructed.
30 See Chander, supra note 28; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1258 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 15, at 18–20; Kroll et al., supra note 28.
31 See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 1; Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189
(2013); Hamilton, supra note 3; Harcourt, supra note 11; Starr, supra note 1; Michael Tonry, Legal and
Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 167 (2014).
32 See Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Remarks at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014),
28

EAGLIN GALLEYPROOFS

2017]

10/13/2017 12:57 PM

CONSTRUCTING RECIDIVISM RISK

67

regarding the challenges that stem from tool construction. Second, this Article
joins a growing body of scholarship on the risks of applying big data
techniques to the administration of criminal justice. Whether predictive
analytics produce evidence that should be relied upon in the criminal justice
system is an apparent yet under-theorized component to this development.33
This Article lays foundation for the expansion of that discourse by explaining
why caution and accountability measures are necessary when predicting
recidivism risk.
I. CONSTRUCTING RECIDIVISM RISK TOOLS
While recidivism risk has long influenced criminal justice outcomes, the
use of actuarial tools heralds a new, data-centric approach to prediction in
sentencing. Initial attempts to use prediction in sentencing determinations
relied upon clinical assessment of recidivism risk to inform parole release
decisions.34 By the 1980s, states and the federal system began to introduce the
“science of probabilities” into sentencing law through a variety of methods.
For example, sentencing commissions incorporated criminal history into
determinate sentencing guidelines as a measure of recidivism risk.35 Specific
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminaldefense-lawyers-57th; Sonja B. Starr, Opinion, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/opinion/sentencing-by-the-numbers.html.
33 For more general insight on this discourse in the context of trials, see, for example, Andrea Roth,
Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972 (2017) [hereinafter Roth, Machine Testimony]; Andrea Roth, Trial by
Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245 (2016) [hereinafter Roth, Trial by Machine]; Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty and
Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). See
also Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our Antiquated
Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633 (2014) (discussing the failure of the criminal justice system to
handle high-tech evidence); Murphy, supra note 13 (explaining the use of DNA typing, data mining, location
tracking, and biometric technologies).
34 Under the indeterminate sentencing structures prevalent until the late 1970s, parole boards frequently
used clinical assessments of recidivism risk to inform choices about whether and when to release an offender
on parole. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 52–55. These assessments were “clinical” in the sense that
professional psychologists interviewed defendants, asking a series of unguided questions to determine whether
the defendant would commit a crime in the future. See id. at 40–42. The expert “relied on whatever
information the individual clinician deemed pertinent” to produce a recidivism risk prediction. Christopher
Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 283 (2006); see also Barbara D.
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized
Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1423 (1979) (“A clinical decisionmaker is not committed in advance of decision
to the factors that will be considered and the rule for combining them.”).
35 Professor Paul Robinson, a former commissioner on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, explained in
2001, “[t]he rationale for heavy reliance upon criminal history in sentencing guidelines is its effectiveness in
incapacitating dangerous offenders.” Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1431 n.7 (2001). State sentencing
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calls to use selective incapacitation theory at sentencing also reflected an
interest in prediction.36 This theory supported the proliferation of legislatively
created sentencing reforms that relied predominately on prior criminal history,
including mandatory minimum penalties and “three strikes” laws.37 These
sentencing reforms enhanced punishment for prior offenders because studies
indicated that prior criminal history was the best predictor of recidivism.38
Most reforms introduced enhancements by aggregating similar crimes or
defendants with similar criminal histories so that judges would increase
sentence length in certain types of cases.39
The recent resurgence in prediction at sentencing is different. Entities
inside and outside the justice system now produce risk assessment tools that
estimate an individual’s likelihood of recidivism based on factors not
necessarily connected to the criminal justice system. The tools assess
recidivism risk based on actuarial—or statistical—analysis of data-driven
observations about previously arrested or convicted individuals’ past
behavior.40 The tools rank and classify a defendant based on a series of
identified factors that correlate with the occurrence of specific criminalized
behavior.41 Many of these factors do not relate to the defendant’s offense of

guidelines likely use similar logic to support development of guideline systems that rely predominately on
prior criminal history as well. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 91–92; see also RICHARD S. FRASE ET AL.,
ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL HISTORY ENHANCEMENTS SOURCEBOOK 14–
16 tbl.1.1 (2015), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/criminal-history-enhancements-sourcebook
(identifying at least five states that explicitly justify criminal history enhancement based on risk, but noting
that the majority of states do not explain why they enhance sentences based on prior criminal history).
36 Selective incapacitation refers to a theory of punishment focused on predicting the offenders capable
of rehabilitation and those who have a high risk of reoffending and should thus be incapacitated for extended
terms. See Eaglin, supra note 31, at 222–23.
37 HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 91–93. For a more detailed description of these laws, see Jessica M.
Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 601, 615–16 (2016).
38 HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 91.
39 Professor Albert Alschuler recognized that the sentencing guidelines reflected a “changed attitude
towards sentencing” that emphasizes “rough aggregations and statistical averages” about “collections of cases
and . . . social harm,” rather than “individual offenders and the . . . circumstances of their cases.” Albert W.
Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 951
(1991).
It is worth noting that consideration of individual risk at sentencing declined by the 1990s as states shifted
focus toward reducing unwarranted disparities and imposing retributive punishment. Although considerations
of risk remained when determining treatment interventions, its use to determine the nature or duration of a
sentence became highly suspect. See Tonry, supra note 31, at 167. This method of prediction is now
experiencing a resurgence. See id.
40 See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 1–2.
41 There are two types of risk assessment tools—those that pre-identify risk factors (“checklist tools”)
and those that allow the computer to derive predictive factors (“machine learning tools”). See RICHARD BERK,
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conviction or criminal history. When used at sentencing, the tool’s outcome
estimates the likelihood of a defendant engaging in criminal behavior in the
future.42 That result can influence determinations about whether the defendant
should be diverted from incarceration to probation, the length of criminal
justice supervision, or specific interventions made available during that term of
supervision.43
A variety of public and private entities currently develop recidivism risk
assessment instruments. Commercial risk tools occupy a large space in the
field of prediction at sentencing.44 Private companies have developed some of
the leading tools used in several jurisdictions. These include the Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS)
assessment tool designed by Northpointe Institute for Public Management,
Inc.45 and the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) designed by MultiHealth Systems, Inc.46
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORECASTS OF RISK: A MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH 18 (2012) (describing simple crosstabulation tools versus complex data mining tools); see also Mayson, supra note 1, at 9–11 (distinguishing
between “checklist” and “machine forecasting” tools). The most prevalent risk tools used at sentencing are
checklist tools. See, e.g., PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK & NEEDS
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS app. at A-31 (2014), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/CSI/BJA%20RNA%20Final%20Report_Combined%20Files%208-22-14.ashx; JAMES, supra
note 10, at tbl.B-1 (canvasing leading risk and needs instruments). As such, these tools are the focus of this
Article. See infra notes 51–52, 56–58. However, researchers are steering risk tool development in the direction
of machine learning. See Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform
Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222 (2015). There, the computer identifies factors to estimate risk
based on constantly updated data and more complex and powerful algorithms. See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note
28, at 638. Such tools will present unique challenges at sentencing, some of which are addressed here. See
infra Section III.B.3. More nuanced research promises to address the specific challenges these tools present in
more detail in the future.
42 This development is consistent with the shift towards a new penology of punishment described by
Professors Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon in the early 1990s. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan
Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30
CRIMINOLOGY 449, 455 (1992) (“The new penology . . . is about identifying and managing unruly groups.”).
As noted elsewhere, this approach is crystallized in neorehabilitative reforms, including the use of actuarial
risk tools at sentencing. See generally Eaglin, supra note 31. This Article expands on the previous observations
of Professors Feeley and Simon by examining one of the “new technologies to identify and classify risk”
highlighted in their previous work. See Feeley & Simon, supra, at 457.
43 See supra note 7.
44 Monahan & Skeem, supra note 7, at 499 (recognizing the wide array of “[c]ommercial off-the-shelf
tools” developing for use in sentencing alongside government designed tools). This is consistent with the
broader reality that private sector industries develop, market, and maintain most technology devices and tools
used in the criminal justice system, including GPS tracking devices, biometrics, and the like. Erin Murphy, The
Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and
Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 536 (2013).
45 NORTHPOINTE, INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE (2015), https://assets.documentcloud.
org/documents/2840784/Practitioner-s-Guide-to-COMPAS-Core.pdf (discussing Northpointe’s risk scales for
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Some state sentencing commissions have developed state-specific
predictive tools for sentencing. For example, the Virginia Sentencing
Commission created several risk assessment tools used at sentencing in the
state.47 These include a nonviolent risk assessment tool used to encourage nonprison sanctions for the lowest risk defendants and a separate predictive tool
applied to sex offenders.48 The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing is in
the final stages of developing its own risk assessment tool for sentencing,
too.49
In addition, other public-private entities are developing risk tools. For
example, Canadian psychologists and professors developed the popular
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG).50 Statisticians at the University of
Cincinnati Corrections Institute (UCCI) developed the Ohio Risk Assessment
System (ORAS), which includes several tools used at sentencing.51 Private
non-profit organizations also fund independent development of risk prediction

general recidivism, violent recidivism, and pretrial misconduct). Please note that Northpointe, Inc., recently
rebranded itself as equivant. All product lines remain intact, including COMPAS. See Courtview,
Constellation & Northpointe Re-brand to Equivant, EQUIVANT, http://www.equivant.com/blog/we-haverebranded-to-equivant.
46 CASEY ET AL., supra note 41, app. at A-38.
47 Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with Integrated Offender Risk
Assessment, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 176 (2013).
48 Id. at 177.
49 See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2154.7 (West Supp. 2017) (requiring the commission to
develop a risk assessment instrument for sentencing); Risk Assessment Project, PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G
(2017), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment.
50 See GRANT T. HARRIS ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 5–7 (3d ed.
2015).
51 Risk Assessment, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI CORR. INST. (2017), http://cech.uc.edu/centers/ucci/services/
risk-assessment.html (describing risk assessment tools developed for Ohio). See generally CASEY ET AL., supra
note 41, at app. A-52–56 (explaining the use of ORAS at sentencing and its development). UCCI replicated the
ORAS system for use in Indiana. The Indiana Risk Assessment System (IRAS) and the Indiana Youth
Assessment System (IYAS), IND. JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/cadp/2762.htm. The Indiana
Risk Assessment System (IRAS), based on the ORAS system, similarly does not indicate that it was
specifically designed for post-conviction sentencing purposes. See, e.g., PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USE OF RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GRANT
COUNTY, INDIANA 5 (2013), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/RNA%20Brief%20-%20Grant
%20County%20IN%20csi.ashx. Rather, UCCI validated the tools used in Ohio, including a pretrial tool, a
community supervision tool, and a reentry tool for use in the state. Indiana sentencing courts are encouraged to
use complementary risk tools (often commercial) to supplement the IRAS system. See UNIV. OF CINCINNATI,
INDIANA RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM i–iii (2010), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/Indiana
%20Risk%20Assessment%20System%20(April%202010).pdf (discussing use of the tool).
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tools. The Laura and John Arnold Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation
lead in these efforts.52
Some tools predict recidivism generally, while others estimate recidivism
for specific types of offenses.53 Certain tools purport to predict whether a
person is at risk of committing a violent crime,54 a sex offense,55 or some other
specific type of offense.56 Tools may be designed for distinct criminal justice
use. Certain tools, like the VRAG and the Static-99, use limited, immutable

52 The Laura and John Arnold Foundation focuses on developing risk assessment tools for use in pretrial
bail determinations. See Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD
FOUND. (Nov. 2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-research-summary_
PSA-Court_4_1.pdf. The MacArthur Foundation played a critical role in development of risk tools for use in
mental health services. JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF
MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001). Both are looking to expand their role in criminal justice reform
through reliance on data-driven interventions to reduce unnecessary reliance on incarceration while ensuring
public safety. See, e.g., The Front End of the Criminal Justice System, LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD FOUND.,
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/crime-prevention/ (investing in “data, analytics and
technology” to improve criminal justice decision making); Criminal Justice, MACARTHUR FOUND. (Oct.
2016), https://www.macfound.org/programs/criminal-justice/strategy/ (investing in data analytics research). As
such, they are both likely to continue pursuing the development and use of predictive tools.
53 Tools are sometimes referred to as “generations” because tool capabilities have evolved over time. See
Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231,
236–39 (2015) (describing first- through fourth-generation risk tools). Generation delineation is not important
to understanding risk assessment tools for this discussion. See Monahan & Skeem, supra note 7, at 499 (“In
our view, distinctions between risk and needs (and associated generations of tools) create more confusion than
understanding. Basically, tools differ in the sentencing goal they are meant to fulfill and in their emphasis on
variable risk factors.”).
54 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 126 (in developing VRAG, the tool designers’ goal was “an actuarial
instrument to predict which offenders would commit at least one additional act of criminal violence given the
opportunity”).
55 See id. at 137 (explaining impetus to develop the Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide, which
focuses on “the risk of violent recidivism among sex offenders,” specifically); Static-99/Static-99R, STATIC99
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://wwww.static99.org (stating that “Static-99/R is the most widely used sex offender risk
assessment instrument in the world”).
56 See EDWARD J. LATESSA ET AL., UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM
MISDEMEANOR ASSESSMENT TOOL (ORAS-MAT) AND MISDEMEANOR SCREENING TOOL (ORAS-MST)
(2014), https://ext.dps.state.oh.us/OCCS/Pages/Public/Reports/ORAS%20MAT%20report%20%20occs%20
version.pdf (predicting recidivism of misdemeanor offenders). A series of tools also predict an offender’s
tendency toward psychopathy and other dynamic characteristics like anger, which are outside the scope of this
Article’s focus. See, e.g., ROBERT D. HARE, HARE PCL-R: HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED (2d ed.
2003) (describing creation of the psychopathy checklist); David J. Simourd, The Criminal Sentiments ScaleModified and Pride in Delinquency Scale: Psychometric Properties and Construct Validity of Two Measures
of Criminal Attitudes, 24 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 52 (1997) (describing the link between criminal attitude and
conduct).
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factors to predict risk of re-offense only.57 Other tools seek both to estimate the
offender’s risk of recidivism and to provide insight about interventions that
could reduce risk.58 Such tools, like the LSI-R, include static and dynamic risk
variables, making them useful for sentencing and correctional use.59
The following sections describe how entities construct actuarial risk tools,
focusing on key decisions of significance to sentencing law and policy.
Section A discusses how entities choose to predict recidivism risk. It examines
creation of the data set, development of the statistical model underlying any
actuarial risk tool, selection of the predictive factors, and creation of the model.
Section B discusses how entities choose to produce risk tools for use in the
criminal justice system. It examines how tool developers convey models
through various mechanisms and how they choose to translate quantitative
model outcomes into qualitative recidivism risk scores and categories.
A. Predicting Recidivism Risk
No predictive tool is better than the data set from which it originates.60 Data
collection choices, like where and how to collect data and how to assemble a
data set, provide the foundation for actuarial tools developed to assess
recidivism risk. These decisions have a significant effect on the outcomes of
the tools. As Professor Kate Crawford explains, “Data and data sets are not
objective; they are creations of human design.”61 Data sets, she notes, are
“intricately linked to physical place and human culture.”62 In other words, data
only tells the story of the places from where it derives. To appreciate the scope

57 Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal History on Risk Assessments, 20
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 92–93 (2015). For example, the VRAG uses twelve variables to assess recidivism
risk. Id. at 93.
58 See JAMES BONTA & D.A. ANDREWS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 67 (6th ed. 2017).
59 Hamilton, supra note 57, at 93–94. “Static” factors include those risk variables that cannot be changed,
like age, gender, and criminal history. See D.A. Andrews & James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice
Policy and Practice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39, 45–46 (2010); see also Tonry, supra note 31, at 172
(noting that several static factors are actually variable markers, meaning that they are fixed at time of
assessment, but subject to change). “Dynamic” factors include variables that are mutable in nature, like
addiction and antisocial behavior. See Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled”
Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 275 (2013).
60 See Stephen D. Gottfredson & Laura J. Moriarty, Statistical Risk Assessment: Old Problems and New
Applications, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 178, 183 (2006).
61 Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 1, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/
04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data.
62 Id.
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and limitations of a risk assessment tool, one must begin by considering the
contours of its foundational data set.
The following subsections examine the great discretion entities developing
risk tools exercise in creating risk prediction models. First, developers select
the data. Second, developers must define “recidivism” in terms of a measurable
target variable, like arrest. Third, developers select the predictive factors to
observe in a data set. These factors may originate from empirical literature on
recidivism, but not necessarily. Fourth, developers construct the predictive
model. Decisions about the data to collect, the recidivism event to observe, and
the risk factors selected have great import to understanding what and how a
resulting recidivism risk tool predicts.
1. Collecting the Data
To predict risk of recidivism, tool creators collect data on people charged
or convicted of crimes in the past as a base population.63 Developers obtain
this data from a variety of sources. They may conduct a study to observe the
behavior of the selected individuals themselves over time.64 They may obtain
information directly from government agencies for repurposing.65 They may
simply collect publicly available information for repurposing.66 Developers
decide how to select the base population for their data sets. This decision
creates the world within which statistical models generate predictions.

63 Although developers could collect information about any set of individuals, see infra note 83, they
tend to collect information about individuals charged or convicted of a crime in the past. See, e.g., EDWARD
LATESSA ET AL., UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, CREATION AND VALIDATION OF THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM:
FINAL REPORT 13–14 (2009), http://www.ocjs.ohio.gov/ORAS_FinalReport.pdf (collecting data based on
“adult[s] charged with a criminal offense” for both the pretrial and postconviction risk assessment tools); VA.
CODE ANN. § 17.1-803 (West 2013) (directing the Virginia Sentencing Commission to develop a risk
assessment instrument for sentencing “based on a study of Virginia felons”).
64 See, e.g., LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 15–16.
65 See, e.g., PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT: INTERIM REPORT 2 ON
RECIDIVISM STUDY: INITIAL RECIDIVISM INFORMATION 1–2 (2011), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-andresearch/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report-2-recidivism-studyinitial-recidivism-information [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT 2] (collecting arrest information from state police
and date of release from prison or probation from the department of corrections).
66 This information may be collected from a private vendor. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS:
A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 11–12 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (data brokers can collect data from state and local governments for
repurposing); see also Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 49 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (discussing the risk of errors in data brokers databases).
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Developers tend to derive the base population from one of two sources:
individuals observed upon release from prison or those referred to probation
services. The ORAS includes two tools used at sentencing—the Community
Supervision Tool (ORAS-CST) and the Misdemeanor Assessment Tool
(ORAS-MAT).67 Dr. Edward Latessa and his team of researchers designed the
ORAS-CST using 681 adults charged with any criminal offense (felony or
misdemeanor) and referred to probation services between September 2006 and
February 2007.68 The Northpointe General Recidivism Risk tool used 30,000
presentence investigation reports and probation intake cases collected from
prison, parole, jail and probation sites.69 The Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing’s risk tool relied on information pulled from the presentencing
investigation reports of 41,563 individuals collected and maintained by the
state’s sentencing commission between 2004 and 2006.70 The VRAG used data
from two studies on recidivism conducted in Canada.71
Underlying data originate from a variety of locations as well. Commercial
tools tend to derive their data from selected offenders in narrowly defined
regions. For example, the multi-state, commercial tools developed by
Northpointe, Inc. generated a data set from prisoners in several unidentified
correctional facilities in the northeastern region of the United States.72 Statespecific risk assessment tools introduce geographic limits to their base
population as well. For example, Pennsylvania’s Commission on Sentencing
conducted a recidivism study to provide the basis for the development of the
state-specific sentencing tool.73 The Commission’s data set is composed of
offenders from just four of the sixty-seven counties in the state—Centre,

67 See Ohio Judicial Conference Cmty. Corr. Comm., Policy Statement on the Ohio Risk Assessment
System and Risk and Needs Assessment Tools, OHIO JUD. CONF. 1 (Mar. 20, 2015), http://ohiojudges.org/
Document.ashx?DocGuid=9e4c2814-6ffa-4018-9156-88fea13bf95e.
68 LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 14. Latessa and his team designed the ORAS-MAT in 2014 using a
subset of the data pulled for creation of the ORAS-CST. See LATESSA ET AL., supra note 56, at 8.
69 See NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 45, at 11; see also COMPAS Risk & Need Assessment System:
Selected Questions Posed by Inquiring Agencies, NORTHPOINTE, INC. (2012), http://www.northpointeinc.com/
files/downloads/FAQ_Document.pdf (providing an overview of the many norm groups available).
70 INTERIM REPORT 2, supra note 65, at 1–2.
71 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 125.
72 NORTHPOINTE, INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS 15 (2012), http://www.northpointeinc.com/
files/technical_documents/FieldGuide2_081412.pdf.
73 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT: INTERIM REPORT 1: REVIEW OF
FACTORS USED IN RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 1 (2011), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-andresearch/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report-1-review-of-factorsused-in-risk-assessment-instruments [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT 1].
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Berks, Philadelphia, and Delaware.74 By comparison, the Ohio study included
offenders from fourteen of the eighty-eight counties across the state.75 There,
developers specifically sought to create geographic diversity in the data set.76
2. Defining Recidivism
Selecting the base population for observation is only part of the initial data
collection process. To glean information from that base population, developers
must specify the outcomes they wish to study and the key variables they wish
to observe.77 This requires developers to translate a problem—here,
recidivism—into a formal question about variables.78 Framing this question
requires that developers understand the objectives and requirements of the
problem and convert this knowledge into a data problem definition.79 It is a
“necessarily subjective process,” requiring developers to finesse a social
dilemma such that a computer can automate a responsive answer.80
Developers frame this question around what they would like to know at
sentencing: whether this person will commit a crime in the future. They
translate the problem of public safety into a series of questions about the
reoccurrence of criminal behavior and timing.81 For instance, what events
constitute “recidivism”? How far into the future should a tool predict this
occurrence?82 Developers resolve these issues by creating a simple yes–no
question for observation in the data set.
Yet defining recidivism is less intuitive and more subjective than it may
appear. Recidivism means the reoccurrence of criminal behavior by an
individual.83 This is not necessarily a binary outcome—many events could
74

Id. at 8.
LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 13; see Ohio County Map, MAPS OF WORLD, http://www.
mapsofworld.com/usa/states/ohio/ohio-county-map.html (displaying the eighty-eight counties in Ohio) (last
updated Aug. 25, 2017).
76 See LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 12.
77 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 14, at 678.
78 See id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Joan Petersilia, Recidivism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 382 (McShane & Williams eds.,
1996).
82 Id.; see also Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures of Recidivism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 787–88
(2014) (discussing why we care about recidivism).
83 Petersilia, supra note 81, at 382. Recidivism need not be limited to individuals previously convicted of
a crime. However, as Dr. Joan Petersilia notes, “It is much easier to observe . . . [recidivism] among known
offenders” compared to the population at large. Id. It is also an important goal of the criminal justice system
75
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demonstrate recidivism. Regarding those already entangled in the criminal
justice system, these events can vary in public safety significance. A fully
adjudicated event may be the trigger. For example, someone may be
considered a recidivist when convicted of a new crime for a particular type of
offense, such as a violent offense, a property offense, or any offense
whatsoever.84 A criminal justice event that is not fully adjudicated may be the
trigger as well. For example, someone may be considered a recidivist if
arrested and formally charged for a particular offense.85 The trigger may be
merely any new arrest regardless whether formally charged for a particular
type of offense.86 For those individuals already under criminal justice
supervision, the triggering event may be the revocation of probation leading to
return to jail or prison for a new offense.87 This may or may not include less
serious occurrences such as a technical violation of the terms of parole or
probation for administrative reasons, like failure to meet with a probation
officer on time, failure of a drug test, or failure to pay criminal justice debt.88
Most tools rely on arrest as the measure of recidivism, although some
variation exists within this principle across tools. For example, VRAG uses
“any new criminal charge for a violent offense.”89 The explanation behind
VRAG’s definition provides helpful insight as to the types of choices
developers face in defining the recidivism event. Researchers developing
VRAG identified these crimes of violence using Canadian legislation
combined with a bit of their own judgment calls, too.90 For example, the tool
includes all instances of assault whether physical contact occurred or not.91 It
also uses all instances of sexual assault even if the state would classify such
offenses as “nonviolent child molestation.”92 Additionally, as the base
population may have been institutionalized during the study, the developers
included subsequent violent acts that, “in the judgment of research assistants,
would have resulted in criminal charges had the incident occurred outside an
more broadly to reduce recidivism among those who have been punished by the system previously. Id.; see
also Eaglin, supra note 37, at 608–09 (discussing the increasing importance of recidivism rates in sentencing
reform policy).
84 Petersilia, supra note 81, at 384.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See id.; see also Eaglin, supra note 37, at 610 n.98.
89 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 122.
90 See id. at 122–23.
91 Id. at 122.
92 Id.
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institution.”93 Any of these events would count as “violent recidivism” for
purposes of the VRAG tool design.
More generalized tools use any arrest to indicate recidivism. In ORAS,
researchers rely on “arrest for a new crime.”94 Northpointe’s COMPAS tool
uses any arrest, whether it is for a felony or a misdemeanor.95 The
Pennsylvania Commission’s tool defines recidivism as re-arrest and reincarceration on a technical violation for offenders sentenced to prison.96
Developers also determine how far into the future a risk assessment tool
should predict when they assemble a data set.97 The length of the underlying
study constricts the amount of time into the future a tool may predict with any
accuracy. Currently available tools vary in the length of time they purport to
predict. The VRAG predicts recidivism over five years.98 Developers used data
collected over ten years to develop this tool.99 Such depth of research is
unique, as most tools predict recidivism over a shorter period of time. The
ORAS tools estimate recidivism one year from the date of assessment.100
Pennsylvania’s Commission on Sentencing chose to track offenders for a
three-year period during the data-collection phase of its recidivism study.101
Based on its underlying data set, the COMPAS tool estimates likelihood of
recidivism for approximately two years into the future.102
Decisions about what constitutes recidivism and the amount of time over
which to collect data on its occurrence presents fundamental questions for tool
design. Some tool creators offer explanations for their choices. Take ORAS,
for example, where Dr. Edward Latessa concedes that he and his team
collected data on a variety of potential outcome measures—including
conviction, probation violation, and institutional rule infraction—before

93
94
95

Id. at 123.
LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 15–16.
COMPAS Risk & Need Assessment System: Selected Questions Posed by Inquiring Agencies, supra

note 69.
96

INTERIM REPORT 2, supra note 65, at 1.
Petersilia, supra note 81.
98 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 132.
99 Id. at 131.
100 LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 16.
101 INTERIM REPORT 2, supra note 65, at 1–2.
102 See COMPAS Risk & Need Assessment System: Selected Questions Posed by Inquiring Agencies,
supra note 69(noting the two-year limit); NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 45, at 11 (noting that underlying
study was conducted between January 2004 and November 2005).
97
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settling on arrest for a new crime.103 He uses arrest largely because gathering
information later in the criminal justice process would require a longer study
period.104 Additionally, he notes that arrest relates to public safety threats to
the community.105 Similarly, tool creators designing the VRAG explain the
decision to use criminal charges instead of criminal convictions, noting that
charges entail less measurement of error compared to convictions.106 On the
other hand, some tool creators do not explain their choices. The Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing does not indicate why it chooses to use re-arrest as
a metric for recidivism, nor does Northpointe, Inc.107
How developers choose to define recidivism touches on key sentencing
policy decisions often left undecided by state actors. Whether someone in the
underlying data set gets arrested during observation determines if recidivism
occurred.108 This information will be included whether or not the offense was
officially exonerated, prosecutors declined to bring a charge, or a conviction
was overturned.109 Criminal justice scholars and actors have long debated the
role of acquittals and uncharged behavior in sentencing.110 Although
constitutionally permissible to consider at sentencing,111 states use acquittals
and non-convictions to varying degrees.112
3. Selecting Predictive Factors
Tool developers identify potential factors that likely predict recidivism and
then construct a statistical model relying on some of those factors. Once they
run the model, the developers can determine which of these factors have a
103

LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
105 Id. at 16. This is a less compelling point. Latessa and his team recognize this in the report, as they note
that factors predictive of rule violation are also of concern to criminal justice personnel. Id. However, arrest
helps “identify criminogenic needs that are likely to result in danger to the community.” Id.
106 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 123.
107 See NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 45; INTERIM REPORT 2, supra note 65.
108 See supra notes 83–96.
109 See Hamilton, supra note 57, at 104.
110 See Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833 (2012) (challenging the binary
portrayal of guilty versus not guilty). Compare, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8–12 (1988) (explaining the U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s decision to design federal sentencing guidelines that rely on unadjudicated conduct),
with Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523 (1993)
(challenging policy reasons for relying on unadjudicated conduct at sentencing).
111 See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154–55 (1997); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 354
(1990).
112 See Reitz, supra note 110; see also infra Section III.A.
104
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statistically significant correlation with the event in interest. In other words,
they design a predictive model to answer the question: when recidivism occurs,
what other factors tend to be present? To answer that question, developers
must decide which factors to observe in the data set and whether to fold any or
all of those factors into the final model.113
In theory, empirical research on recidivism serves as the starting point for
researchers looking to select predictive factors for testing. Criminologists
began studying factors that predict recidivism with the development of parole
prediction tools in the 1920s.114 Since the decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in
the 1970s,115 several criminologists have developed a robust body of research
on how to reduce offender recidivism.116 Through this research, these
criminologists also identified a number of variables that appear to be robust
predictors of recidivism.117 For example, Dr. Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little, and
Claire Goggin conducted a meta-analysis in 1996 to identify the most
predictive recidivism risk factors.118 They identified seventeen factors with
statistically high correlations to recidivism, including criminal companions,
antisocial behavior, criminogenic needs, adult criminal history, race, family
rearing practices, social achievement, current age, substance abuse, family
structure, intellectual functioning, family criminality, gender, and socioeconomic status.119 Such studies serve as the basis of the recent shift toward
“evidence-based” practice and policy in correctional and sentencing reforms
more broadly.120
Developers make judgment calls about what factors to study in a data set.
Although empirical study may guide that decision, it is not required, and tools
vary in their reliance on the literature. For example, COMPAS uses “key risk

113

See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 14, at 688.
HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 47.
115 See Eaglin, supra note 31, at 222; Klingele, supra note 1, at 542–43.
116 See, e.g., D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT (5th ed. 2010);
Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects,
CRIM. JUST. 2000, July 2000, at 109; Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, From Nothing Works to What
Works: Changing Professional Ideology in the 21st Century, 81 PRISON J. 313 (2001).
117 See, e.g., Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What
Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 576 (1996); Don A. Andrews, Recidivism Is Predictable and Can Be
Influenced: Using Risk Assessments to Reduce Recidivism, CORRECTIONAL SERV. CAN. (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/forum/special/espe_a-eng.shtml.
118 Gendreau et al., supra note 117; see also Oleson, supra note 11, at 1350.
119 Gendreau et al., supra note 117, at 582–83.
120 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 59, at 271; Klingele, supra note 1, at 556.
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factors that have emerged from the recent criminological literature.”121 Some
of the original risk prediction tools are developed by these social scientists and
based on the accumulation of their data on the topic.122 Developers designing
Pennsylvania’s predictive tool, however, did not visit the empirical research
directly. Rather, they searched for factors prevalent in already existing risk
tools then used whatever factors were readily available in their current data
set.123
Developers likely “clean” the data as well, often introducing their
assumptions into the data collection process. Because data sets originate from a
variety of sources, information provided may be incorrect.124 For example, a
presentence investigatory report may state that a defendant is twenty-seven and
recently completed a 100-year sentence for armed robbery. Researchers
seeking to use that information will either “fix” the information or throw the
defendant out of the data set. “Fixing” the information requires subjective
judgments about what the information likely means. For example, that a
twenty-seven-year-old person would have served a 100-year sentence is
impossible, and so it is obviously incorrect. However, a researcher may assume
that a defendant served ten years in prison for armed robbery. Another may
assume that the defendant served one year in prison. Either assumption could
be correct. Other information may help indicate which of these assumptions is
more likely accurate, but there is no way to be certain whether those decisions
were correct. Faced with the choice to exclude or fix the data, different
developers may choose alternative responses. The significance of this
defendant in the data set may be minimal, but one cannot be certain how many
such judgment calls are made without detailed disclosure from the developers.
Having compiled a data set and selected potential predictive factors,
developers create a statistical model to identify which of the potential factors
have a statistically significant correlation with recidivism. That statistical
model provides the basis for the resulting actuarial risk assessment tool used at
sentencing, but a number of subjective design choices are embedded in the
next stage of the process discussed below.

121

See NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 45, at 2.
See supra Section II.A (discussing the fact that Harris, Rice, and Quinsey created the VRAG and
Andrews and Bonta created the LSI-R).
123 See INTERIM REPORT 1, supra note 73, at 3–5.
124 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 14, at 684–85 (explaining how datasets may rely on incorrect or
partial information).
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4. Constructing the Model
Developers decide how many predictive factors to include in the final risk
assessment tool. The VRAG uses twelve factors, including marital status, age,
elementary school maladjustment, and living with biological parents to age
sixteen.125 COMPAS uses fifteen factors, including financial problems,
vocation/educational background, family criminality, residential instability,
and leisure.126 The Virginia Sentencing Commission Risk tool uses eleven
factors, including marital status, age, gender, employment status, and a series
of criminal history related factors.127
Tool creators may use different statistical methods to “weigh” the variables
relative to one another. Two statistical methods prevail. First, some researchers
choose to use the Burgess Method. Conceived by Ernest Burgess in 1928, this
statistical method gives all predictive variables in a model equal weight.128 One
using a predictive model that applies this method need only add each
predictive factor together to determine the probability of recidivism. So, for
example, if males are more likely to recidivate, then males get one point while
females receive zero points for this variable.129 A number of tools follow this
model, including Pennsylvania’s risk tool, wherein presence of a variable leads
to the addition of a point and absence of a variable will be assigned a score of
zero.130
As an alternative, some developers use the Weighted Burgess Method.
Conceived by Professor Sheldon Glueck and research assistant Eleanor Glueck
in 1930, this statistical method assigns different weights to different variables
in the predictive model.131 The weight assigned to certain variables depends on
how predictive that variable may be.132 For example, if researchers determine
that those who have criminal records are more likely to recidivate in the
predictive model, then the presence of prior convictions not only adds points to
a score, but it adds more points than, say, gender, if the researchers find that
125

Hamilton, supra note 3, at 14, 15 tbl.1.
Oleson, supra note 11, at app. at 1400.
127 Id. at app. at 1402.
128 HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 51, 59.
129 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT: INTERIM REPORT 4: DEVELOPMENT
OF RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE 3 (2012), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluationreports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report-4-development-of-risk-assessment-scale/view
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT 4].
130 Id. at 8.
131 HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 60–61.
132 Id.
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variable is also influential, but less so.133 Most tools, including, for example,
those developed by the UCCI,134 use the Burgess Method because it is easier
for laypersons to apply and understand.135 Tool developers now agree that the
alternative prediction methods perform equally well.136
Most tool creators choose to place heavier weight on certain types of
factors beyond the correlations identified in the statistical model to produce
tools with similar accuracy and easier use at sentencing. This design practice is
most prevalent in relation to criminal history factors used in risk assessment
tools.137 For example, some tools include the same criminal history event as
multiple variables in a predictive model. The LSI-R, for example, measures
“prior adult convictions, arrests, charges, parole violations, and other official
records of violence.”138 The Pennsylvania risk model separately counts the
total number of prior arrests and prior convictions, including those for the same
offense.139 In Minnesota’s sexual recidivism tool, six of the nine categories of
risk factors relate to criminal history, even when potentially derived from a
single event.140 In California’s Static Risk Assessment, the tool counts eighteen
separate criminal history factors, some of which overlap.141 The criminal
history factors may include a number of past convictions, past incarceration

133 See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT 4, supra note 129, at 3. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
identifies a third statistical method—the predictive attribute analysis. This method centers on the most
predictive factor for certain types of defendants (male versus female, for example). Id. Data researchers then
assign weight to other predictive variables by predictive ability for that specific type of defendant. Id. This
method is a more advanced version of the Weighted Burgess Method. Currently, some juvenile recidivism
tools use this model. See DON M. GOTTFREDSON & HOWARD N. SNYDER, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,
THE MATHEMATICS OF RISK CLASSIFICATION: CHANGING DATA INTO VALID INSTRUMENTS FOR JUVENILE
COURTS 12 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/209158.pdf.
134 See LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 17.
135 INTERIM REPORT 4, supra note 129, at 8 (selecting the Burgess Method because it “was the most
straightforward”). “[T]he central battle lines [in developing risk tools] were between the Burgess unweighted,
multiple-factor model and the Glueck weighted, few-factor model.” HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 68. But see
INTERIM REPORT 4, supra note 129, at 3 (setting forth a third option: predictive attribute analysis).
136 See INTERIM REPORT 4, supra note 129, at 8.
137 See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 72 (explaining the focus on criminal history factors); Harcourt, supra
note 11, at 239 (explaining most risk tools converge on criminal history factors).
138 See Hamilton, supra note 57, at 98 (citing N.S.W. DEP’T OF CORRECTIVE SERVS., LSI-R TRAINING
MANUAL 13–15 (2002)).
139 See PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT: INTERIM REPORT 3: FACTORS THAT
PREDICT RECIDIVISM FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF OFFENDERS 12 (2011), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-andresearch/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report-3-factors-that-predictrecidivism-for-various-types-of-offenders/view [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT 3].
140 See Hamilton, supra note 57, at 98 (citing Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool (2012)).
141 See id.
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sentences, violent or drug convictions,142 and prior arrests.143 Several tools
include the number of alleged offenses, acquitted conduct, and juvenile
deviance, even if the criminal justice system typically discounts such events.144
Tool creators decide which predictive factors observed in the statistical
model will be included in the resulting actuarial risk tool. Generally, risk
assessment tools include four145 different categories of predictive factors:
criminal history,146 anti-social attitude,147 demographics,148 and socioeconomic
status.149 Tool creators tend to include predictive factors without reference to
whether their use is regulated in state sentencing systems.150 Certain factors
observed in the underlying data set will be excluded because they bear little
relation to recidivism.151 Others, like race and gender, may have high statistical
correlation, but due to constitutional and ethical concerns, will be excluded
from the resulting actuarial tool.152 Some factors may be highly predictive, but
142

Oleson, supra note 11, at app.
The Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission’s draft risk assessment tool depends heavily on arrests,
unlike most other tools developed. See Barry-Jester et al., supra note 3. The eight-factor risk tool predicts rearrest, not reconviction, and almost 40% of the score’s outcome depends on history of arrest including prior
adult arrests, prior property arrests, and prior drug arrests. See PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS
ASSESSMENT PROJECT: INTERIM REPORT 8: COMMUNICATING RISK AT SENTENCING 7 (2014), http://pcs.la.psu.
edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report8-communicating-risk-at-sentencing/view [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT 8].
144 See Hamilton, supra note 57, at 95–96.
145 Starr, supra note 1, at 811 (noting that most tools include criminal-history variables, demographic
variables, and socioeconomic variables). These are consistent with the core variables associated with
criminogenic needs. Some refer to the “big six”: antisocial values, criminal peers, low self-control,
dysfunctional family ties, substance abuse, and criminal personality. Others refer to the “big four” variables:
antisocial associates, attitudes, personality, and criminal history. Still others refer to the “central eight”
variables: antisocial associates, attitudes, personality, criminal history, family/marital circumstances,
school/work difficulties, antisocial leisure/recreation, and substance abuse. ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note
116, at 65–66; Oleson, supra note 11, at 1349 n.133.
146 Criminal history is the most common recidivism risk factor. For a discussion of the focus on this factor
over time, see HARCOURT, supra note 1, 56–72; see also Oleson, supra note 11, at 1355–56 (discussing the
prevalence of adult criminal history amongst risk prediction tools).
147 This may include a number of variables outside the defendant’s control, including family relations,
addictions, and mental conditions. Oleson, supra note 11, at 1362–64.
148 Demographic variables include age, gender, and marital status. Starr, supra note 1, at 811.
149 Socioeconomic factors include, for example, employment status, financial condition, residential
stability, and living in neighborhoods with high crime. Oleson, supra note 11, at 1360–61.
150 This author’s research did not find a single reference to state sentencing decisions about which factors
should be considered at sentencing in the discussion of actuarial risk tool development. Although lack of cross
reference cannot be certain given limited transparency in tool creation, the ubiquitous silence on the topic is
significant.
151 See Oleson, supra note 11, at 1350–52.
152 See Eaglin, supra note 31, at 216–17 (discussing the decline in using race in recidivism risk tools and
the reasoning behind this trend); Oleson, supra note 11, at 1380–82 (stating that race is highly predictive). On
143

EAGLIN GALLEYPROOFS

84

10/13/2017 12:57 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:59

tool creators exclude them for ease of use.153 Just because a predictive factor is
observed in the statistical model and found to have a statistically significant
correlation to recidivism does not mean it will be included in the resulting risk
tool.154 Rather, the statistical correlation that such factors have with recidivism
provide only one of many factors that a tool creator may consider when
choosing which predictive factors should be included in a tool.
Determining which factors should be considered at sentencing is a
notoriously difficult policy choice that has divided scholars, judges, and
lawmakers for decades. For example, the U.S. Sentencing Commission notably
restricted the factors that can be considered relevant at sentencing.155 As
Professor John Monahan noted in 2006, “[w]ith the single exception of
criminal history . . . virtually all of the variables that potentially could be used
as scientifically valid risk factors for violence . . . are explicitly excluded from
consideration in federal sentencing procedures.”156 This reality has changed
slightly as the federal sentencing guidelines are now advisory,157 and the
Sentencing Commission has reconsidered its hardline exclusion of several
factors pertinent to the defendant’s personal background in recent years.158
Nevertheless, this statement reflects the reality that most factors included in
recidivism risk tools have been highly regulated in the sentencing context. This
principle applies in the states as well as the federal system, where some state
sentencing provisions similarly endeavor to regulate the factors that are
considered under specific sentencing guidelines.159 Although use of criminal
history may be ubiquitous, the ability to consider other factors varies greatly
amongst the states due to legislatively imposed guidelines or guidelines created
by sentencing commissions.

the other hand, gender is frequently used in risk tools. For discussion of the problematic implications of
including gender as a predictive factor in actuarial risk tools, see, for example, Starr, supra note 1, at 823–29.
153 Oleson, supra note 11, at 1348–49.
154 Id.
155 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1–1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004); KATE
STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 74–75
(1998).
156 Monahan, supra note 5, at 397–98.
157 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
158 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. 3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011) (revising
the guidelines to permit consideration of age, mental and emotional condition, physical condition or
appearance, and military service).
159 See Monahan, supra note 5, at 398–99 (discussing state and federal limitations). See generally DAN
MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 15–16 (2009)
(discussing various state approaches to consideration of family ties at sentencing, including limitations).
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B. Creating a Risk Assessment Tool
After the design decisions are made, researchers create the actual risk
assessment tool. The risk assessment tool applies the undisclosed algorithm
that predicts recidivism consistently across cases. The algorithm reflects the
normative judgments discussed above about what factors should count and
how much when predicting recidivism. The algorithm produces an
instantaneous quantitative outcome based on the information selected from the
predictive model. This outcome suggests the numerical probability that the
tool-defined recidivism event will occur with individuals sharing those same
characteristics.160 In other words, it ranks defendants according to likelihood of
engaging in criminal behavior based on the behavior of the individuals in the
underlying data set. Most risk tools translate that quantitative outcome into a
qualitative “risk score” used by criminal justice actors at sentencing.
It is worth noting a few points about how criminal justice actors administer
the tools to estimate a specific defendant’s risk score. Developers create
instructions for criminal justice actors to use when administering the tool.161
Several tools require that probation officers or other intake personnel collect
information via a structured interview with the defendant.162 For example, the
Indiana Risk Assessment System’s Community Supervision Intake Assessment
provides a five-page, structured interview questionnaire.163 Some tools require
that the defendant provide information voluntarily.164 As an example, the
COMPAS system permits the collection of offender information through
official records data and a defendant’s self-reporting.165 Still others require no
formal collection of information at all; instead, criminal justice administrators
rely on publicly accessible data. As an example, the Laura and John Arnold
160

See Hamilton, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Risk Assessment, supra note 51; Judicial Conference of Indiana, Policy for User Certification
for the Indiana Youth Assessment System & Indiana Risk Assessment System, IND. JUD. BRANCH (Aug. 25,
2011), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/cadp/files/prob-risk-iyas-iras-user-certification-2011.pdf.
162 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 152; LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 11–12. COMPAS offers an
option—the defendant may fill out a self-report or the criminal justice administrator may conduct an interview.
COMPAS Risk & Need Assessment System: Selected Questions Posed by Inquiring Agencies, supra note 69.
Future tools may not require an interview at all. For example, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation is
developing risk prediction tools that do not require a structured interview. See Developing a National Model
for Pretrial Risk Assessment, supra note 52.
163 See UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, supra note 51, at 2-3–2-8.
164 See id.
165 Structured interviews are available, but not required. COMPAS Risk & Need Assessment System:
Selected Questions Posed by Inquiring Agencies, supra note 69; see also CASEY ET AL., supra note 41, app. at
A-25.
161
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Foundation developed a risk assessment tool that eliminates the interview
process entirely for criminal justice administrators.166 This practice will likely
expand to other tools as well.167
These examples demonstrate the variety in administrative expectations
required amongst current recidivism risk tools. Administrators rely on that
information, along with official records and other collateral sources to
complete the assessment tool.168 Defendants may complete self-reports to
complement that information. A criminal justice administrator collects any
requisite information and puts it into a computer system or calculates the risk
score by hand on a specified worksheet.169
Most risk tools translate the quantitative tool score into a qualitative risk
classification to facilitate use.170 To do this, thresholds are set into a statistical
model’s outcomes that divide offenders into different pools, or categories. The
typical division is some version of low-, medium-, and high-risk offenders.171
“Cut-off points” refers to the numerical scores that serve to divide the line
between these categories of offenders.
An example illustrates this process. An actuarial risk tool may indicate that
a defendant has a 10% chance of being arrested for a nonviolent act within one
year of conducting the assessment, assuming nothing changes in that time
frame. But actuarial tools do not communicate information from the predictive
model in this way. Rather, the tools classify defendants into risk categories—
meaning the tools indicate that a numerical score signifies a certain risk level.

166 See Lauryn Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing the shift
away from interviews as the basis of risk assessment tools in the pretrial detention context).
167 See supra note 162.
168 See CASEY ET AL., supra note 41, app. at A-56.
169 For example, the Virginia, Ohio, and Indiana risk tools may be calculated by hand. UNIV. OF
CINCINNATI, supra note 51, at 2-9–2-41. The COMPAS tools require a computer.
170 Tool creators translate the numbers to words for a variety of reasons. Lay people may find numerical
probabilities “unnatural and awkward” and “aesthetic[ally] revulsi[ve]” compared to language. PHILIP E.
TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION 56 (2015). Tool
creators want to develop tools that bridge the divide between data and practicalities with ease. See id. They
may even want to represent a certain amount of surety in their calculations. See id. Recidivism classifications
are familiar to criminal justice actors, whether those terms are backed by statistical data or not. See Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (“[P]rediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of
the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system.”). Sensitive to varying concerns and
perspectives, tool creators likely translate the numerical risk scores into risk categories for broader use. See
TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra, at 56.
171 For a real-world example of the risk categories applied to statistical model outcomes, see INTERIM
REPORT 8, supra note 143, at 4.
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The 10% chance of recidivism may mean a low, medium, or high risk of
recidivism depending on where tool creators introduce the cut-off points
between classification levels.
Translating tool outcomes into risk categories is a highly subjective, policyoriented process. This decision requires some expertise not only in what the
tool is predicting,172 but also in how society interprets the numerical outcome’s
meaning.173 In short, where developers place cut-off points reflects a normative
judgment about how much likelihood of risk is acceptable in society without
intervention.174 Using the example from above, is a 10% likelihood of
engaging in criminal behavior an acceptable level of risk such that additional
supervision is unnecessary? What about 15%? When should a level of risk
shift from acceptable—meaning low risk—to unacceptable—meaning high
risk? Tools vary in this judgment.
***
The normative judgments described above have real significance for a
defendant at sentencing. Take as a hypothetical, defendant X and defendant Y.
Defendant X is male, twenty-five, and lives in an urban center with a high
crime rate. He dropped out of high school to take care of his pregnant
girlfriend, and now has a young child. He is black. Defendant Y is female,
forty, and lives in a rural community with a low crime rate. She finished high
school, but fails to maintain a steady job due to drug addiction. Although she
had a persistent shoplifting problem in high school, the stores never reported
her to the police out of respect for her family. She is white. Both defendant X
and defendant Y commit a crime, say theft. Both are convicted. The normative
judgments described above will affect whether and how both of these
defendants’ are categorized for risk, which in turn can affect the length and
amount of supervision each faces.175
Section A illustrates that factors like education, housing, employment,
criminal history, and family ties can affect the outcome of the risk assessment
tool. Developers make decisions about which of those factors matter, why, and
how much. Section B illustrates that whether the tool results place defendant X
in a higher risk category than defendant Y depends on how developers
172

See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 14, at 678–79.
See TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 170, at 53.
174 See Mayson, supra note 1 (discussing various levels of risk considered “high” for pretrial risk
assessment tools).
175 See supra note 7.
173
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translate the tool’s numerical outcomes into qualitative risk categories.
Defendant X and defendant Y may both be considered to have a high or low
risk of recidivism subject to placement of the cut-off points between risk
categories, even if the model ranks defendant X as more likely than
defendant Y to engage in criminal behavior in the future. Developers must
decide how to separate the tool outcomes to create risk categories. Together,
these sections illustrate that the seemingly objective and neutral representation
of one defendant as high risk and another as low risk is a matter of tool
construction.
Part I demonstrates two further points as well. First, constructing actuarial
risk tools for sentencing requires that developers make a variety of choices
with great consequence to sentencing law and policy. These choices reflect
normative judgments about what counts at sentencing and why. These choices
also reflect larger normative judgments about how much risk society tolerates.
States vary in how they may decide these choices, although the tools developed
to estimate risk largely do not.
The second point develops more subtly throughout; namely, that it is
difficult to ascertain these policy decisions on the face of the tool. Even though
previous efforts to estimate risk at sentencing—like guidelines and mandatory
penalties—made normative judgments about how to sentence and why, those
choices were apparent on the face of the mechanized tool. For example, a
mandatory penalty for an offense is triggered by a particular fact, like a prior
conviction. With actuarial risk tools, normative judgments are more difficult or
even impossible to discern. The following Part identifies threats these tools
present to sentencing law and policy.
II. CONSTRUCTING TOOLS WITHOUT GUIDANCE: THREATS TO SENTENCING
LAW AND POLICY
Tools constructed to estimate recidivism risk reflect numerous normative
choices. There is no such thing as a “value-free” tool.176 One might argue that
developers do not need guidance on how to determine policy judgments
embedded in risk tools’ construction. Underlying this logic is the assumption
that because the tools are data-driven, the information produced is objective,
neutral, and valuable to society. This Part contests that assertion, thereby

176

See BERK, supra note 41, at 6.
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making the case for accountability measures for tools designed to predict
recidivism risk.
Sections A through C identify three types of normative judgments
implicated in decisions about how to construct actuarial risk tools: judgments
about accuracy, equality, and the purpose of punishment. Currently, developers
can make these decisions during tool construction without guidance. Yet, as
section D will explain, developers have unique and diverging interests that
shape tool construction and may, at times, result in conflicting or contradictory
decisions compared to a state’s sentencing policy.
A. Differing Notions of Accuracy
In the criminal justice system more broadly, there are two types of
accuracy. Accuracy may mean reducing the number of people who committed
crimes from evading punishment. It may also mean reducing the number of
innocent people who have not committed crimes from wrongfully experiencing
punishment. These concepts drive at “the twofold aim [of criminal justice] . . .
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”177 Each of these types of
accuracy comes with a cost. Ensuring that the guilty do not escape punishment
at times means increasing the chance that the innocent will suffer. Similarly,
ensuring that the innocent do not suffer means, at times, increasing the chance
of letting the guilty escape punishment. At a theoretical level, society prefers
the latter. 178 Yet whether a risk prediction tool should identify fewer or more
defendants as a recidivism risk—and how many more—is a normative
judgment for which no heuristic can apply and empirical accuracy measures
cannot resolve.
Actuarial risk assessment tools strive toward two separate types of
accuracy as measured by empirical validity studies. These measures are
distinct from the criminal justice aims. On the one hand, there is predictive
accuracy, meaning that a tool predicts what it portends to predict better than
177 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (alteration in original) (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
178 Blackstone’s famous adage, “that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer,” indicates a preference. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352. This statement reflects the
preference that, all things being equal, the system should protect the innocent from wrongful punishment even
at the expense of letting the guilty go free. With the mechanization of criminal justice, this simple preference is
placed in doubt at a practical level. See Roth, Trial by Machine, supra note 33, at 1252–53, 1267–69
(describing criminal mechanizations’ uneven desire for a particular kind of accuracy that prevents lenience and
mercy).
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chance.179 For example, a risk assessment tool is accurate if it successfully
differentiates between those who experienced the outcome of interest and those
who did not more than 50% of the time.180 On the other hand, there is
classification accuracy. A tool achieves this type of accuracy if “the average
predicted recidivism rate is relatively equal to the actual rate of recidivism.”181
In the context of recidivism risk tools, this means that the predicted outcome
event occurs as frequently as anticipated by the tool. Using an example from
Professor Melissa Hamilton, if a tool estimates that 10% of persons
categorized as moderate risk will recidivate and the actual observed recidivism
rate of the moderate group in a validity study is about 10%, then the tool
classifies risk accurately.182
Validity studies assessing predictive and classification accuracy offer
useful, but limited, information regarding the value of a risk assessment tool at
sentencing. For example, a popular method to assess predictive accuracy
measures the area under the curve, or the AUC value.183 This measurement
indicates how well a risk assessment tool discriminates between recidivists and
non-recidivists relative to the occurrence of the event of interest in the base
data set and uninhibited by the policy decisions inherent to classifying
outcomes into risk categories.184 Yet the AUC value provides limited

179

See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 34, at 292.
See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 24–26 (referring to this type of accuracy measure as “discrimination”);
see also Slobogin, supra note 34, at 292. To measure predictive accuracy, developers submit tools to validity
studies such as measuring the area under the curve (AUC), discussed below. See infra notes 183–184. An
AUC value of .50 means that the tool predicts equally as well as chance. Slobogin, supra note 34, at 292. Most
tools used today have AUC values between .60 to .80. Id. at 293.
181 See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 24 (describing this type of accuracy measure as “calibration”).
182 Id.
183 See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 26. Many researchers felt the other predictive accuracy measurements
underrepresented the accuracy of actuarial risk tools because it was constrained by the base rate in a data set.
Gottfredson & Moriarty, supra note 60, at 186 (“The problem in using any of these [other current validity]
measures . . . is that the tool’s apparent usefulness is highly dependent on the base rate, [as well as] the
selection ratio . . . .”); see also Paul R. Falzer, Valuing Structured Professional Judgment: Predictive Validity,
Decision-making, and the Clinical-Actuarial Conflict, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 40, 43–44 (2013); R. Karl Hanson
& David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders: A Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales,
24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 125 (2000).
184 As Professor Melissa Hamilton explains, “The correct interpretation of the AUC (for a recidivism risk
tool) is ‘the probability that a randomly selected individual who committed an [act of recidivism] . . . received
a higher risk classification than a randomly selected individual who did not’ reoffend.” Hamilton, supra note 3,
at 25 (citing Jay P. Singh et al., Measurement of Predictive Validity in Violence Risk Assessment Studies: A
Second-Order Systematic Review, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 55, 64 (2013)) (alteration in original). “The ROC area
has advantages over other commonly used measures of predictive accuracy . . . because it is not constrained by
base rates or selection ratios . . . .” Hanson & Thornton, supra note 183, at 125 (citation omitted). The AUC
180
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information about the value of the tool’s outcome for sentencing. For example,
just because a tool has a high AUC value does not mean that a defendant with
a high risk score will eventually engage in the recidivism event of interest.185
But the limitations go beyond what the predictive accuracy measurement
says about the tool’s results. This method of empirical validation says nothing
about the construction of the tool itself. For example, predictive accuracy
measures say nothing about the legitimacy of risk factors that developers
choose to include or exclude from the tool as a matter of sentencing policy.186
Did the tool use information that is prohibited in a state by law? Predictive
accuracy measures do not provide an answer. Nor does this measure of tool
accuracy say anything about the propriety of using a particular definition of
recidivism for a particular use in the justice system. In other words, does a
jurisdiction care whether a defendant is likely to be rearrested or reconvicted
for particular behavior, and if so, for what? Validity studies assessing the
predictive accuracy of a tool cannot answer these questions because they are
inherently normative.
Similarly, validity studies provide little guidance regarding how developers
divide a risk tool’s outcomes into various risk categories. Recall that any risk
assessment tool translating a predictive score into a qualitative risk assessment
requires that tool developers separate results into risk categories or “bins” like
high, medium, or low risk. Predictive accuracy measures like the AUC value
provide no insight into whether the cut-off points located between high,
medium, and low recidivism risk categories accurately calibrate with actual
outcomes in the real world.187 Yet even validity studies that measure a tool’s
classification accuracy cannot resolve the normative judgment about how
many defendants should fall into each category for sentencing. Because the
tools are designed to study human behavior, they inevitably result in errors,
meaning instances when the predicted outcome does not occur.188 While

value is a fraction obtained from the “ROC value,” meaning receiver operating characteristic curve, referenced
by Hanson and Thornton. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 25.
185 Hamilton, supra note 3, at 25.
186 See, e.g., R. Karl Hanson & Philip D. Howard, Individual Confidence Intervals Do Not Inform
Decision-Makers About the Accuracy of Risk Assessment Evaluations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 281
(2010) (“[T]he judgment concerning the credibility of the risk assessment procedure . . . is fundamentally
qualitative.”).
187 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 3, at 27 (“An AUC [value] can be far above .50 even if the tool is not
well-calibrated (e.g., the percentage of predicted outcomes is significantly different than the proportion of the
actual outcomes).”).
188 See, e.g., id. at 25; Starr, supra note 1, at 843.
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studies demonstrating classification accuracy consider actual outcomes within
the risk bins, the information produced by the tools cannot resolve the tradeoffs
inherent to the construction of those bins. Said differently, this information
says nothing about whether and when classification errors impose unbearable
costs to society when used at sentencing. Addressing this question requires
consideration of normative judgments about the costs of miscategorizing
defendants.
Classification accuracy measurements turn on the placement of cut-off
points between risk categories. Implicit in this placement lies a normative
judgment about the cost of errors.189 At sentencing, the costs associated with
error differ greatly. Failing to identify a defendant as high risk who goes on to
engage in criminal behavior, for example theft, in the future creates a false
negative. It may result in that defendant being released into the community
without more intense criminal justice supervision. This failure imposes a cost
to the victim and his family, to society, and to criminal justice actors. The
victim and his family may experience the physical, emotional, and
psychological harms from the crime. Society incurs the cost of a crime that
could have been prevented. Criminal justice actors incur a cost to their
credibility. On the other hand, identifying a person as high risk who would not
commit a crime in the future—a false positive—also imposes costs. There, the
risk classification may lead to additional and unnecessary criminal justice
supervision. The defendant experiences an infringement to her freedom that
can hinder her reintegration into society. Society incurs the economic costs of
unnecessarily diverting limited criminal justice resources toward the defendant.
It incurs the social costs as well, including the increased likelihood of a
recidivism event. The criminal justice system also incurs a cost to its
credibility. Although not an innocent person, the erroneously classified person
experiences more punishment than she otherwise should.
No “neutral” answer exists to balance the costs described here,190 yet
addressing these costs relates to traditional criminal justice notions of
accuracy. Punishment, like guilt, imposes costs that must be balanced in the
justice system. A lower risk score cut-off point (for example, categorizing
anything more than a 10% likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior in the

189 See Richard Berk, Balancing the Costs of Forecasting Errors in Parole Decisions, 74 ALB. L. REV.
1071, 1074 (2011).
190 For more on the existence of normative judgments in the construction of risk tools, see, for example,
id.; Berk & Hyatt, supra note 41; Mayson, supra note 1.
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future as high risk) captures more of what you want—true positives, meaning
defendants who would recidivate—and more of what you do not want—false
positives.191 A higher cut-off point (for example, categorizing anything over a
90% likelihood as high risk) does the opposite. Where developers place the
cut-off points between various likelihoods of recidivism will affect how many
defendants a tool identifies as significant risk. That determination can subject
defendants to more or less supervision in the criminal justice system regardless
of whether they actually engage in criminal behavior in the future. Reasonable
minds can and do differ regarding what is the right placement to balance the
costs of error at sentencing.
Though the placement of cut-off points relates to both empirical validity
studies and criminal justice accuracy, the law provides no assurance that this
construction decision reflects the values of the jurisdictions where tools are
adopted.192 Indeed, lawmakers rarely offer guidance on how to construct
actuarial risk tools at all. More often, legislators and policymakers advocating
for risk-based sentencing simply point to validity studies from the forensic
science field as a measure of tool quality.193
Of course, tool developers do not suggest that risk tools will eliminate
errors; rather, they suggest that the tools can improve judicial decision making
by reducing errors in determining a defendant’s risk level.194 But when a risk

191 See, e.g., Berk, supra note 189, at 1074–75 (discussing the relative costs of error in parole forecasting);
Hamilton, supra note 3, at 33–35 (discussing costs of error at sentencing).
192 While risk estimates produced by clinicians were subject to testing through scientific boards and
examination on the stand, actuarial risk tools are not currently subjected to this rigorous testing.
193 See, e.g., CASEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 14–18 (urging local validation of risk assessment tools to
ensure reliability); see also DAVID FARABEE ET AL., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., COMPAS VALIDATION
STUDY: FINAL REPORT 3–4 (2010), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/
COMPAS_Final_Report_08-11-10.pdf (assessing California’s general recidivism risk scale as acceptable);
SHARON LANSING, DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., NEW YORK STATE COMPAS-PROBATION RISK AND
NEED ASSESSMENT STUDY: EXAMINING THE RECIDIVISM SCALE’S EFFECTIVENESS AND PREDICTIVE ACCURACY
i (2012), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/opca/compas_probation_report_2012.pdf (assessing
validity of risk tool in New York); BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK
ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE EVALUATION: PROCESS OF SENTENCING REFORM, EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF DIVERSION & RECIDIVISM, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 8 (2002), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk_
off_rpt.pdf (endorsing Virginia’s risk assessment tool on the basis of validity studies); JENNIFER L. SKEEM &
JENNIFER ENO LOUDEN, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE ON THE QUALITY OF THE
CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER MANAGEMENT PROFILING FOR ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS (COMPAS) 28 (2007),
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/COMPAS_Skeem_EnoLouden_Dec_2
007.pdf (recommending California not use COMPAS without more evidence).
194 See Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38 (2011).
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assessment tool can impact a criminal justice outcome like sentencing, it is
important to look beyond just validity studies to determine the value of the tool
at sentencing. Validity studies cannot resolve the difficult normative judgments
inherent to constructing risk tools used in pursuit of the twin aims of the
criminal justice system. Only the communities where the tool will be applied
can do that.
B. Compromising Equality
Actuarial risk tools may compromise equality as a matter of construction.
“Equality” has various meanings.195 This section engages with the concept as a
matter of equal opportunity for a tool to estimate a defendant as low risk.
Using race to demonstrate the point,196 this section will illustrate that risk tools
prevent this type of equality among defendants based on societal realities
potentially overlooked during the tool-construction process.
Most risk tools estimate recidivism risk as the likelihood of engaging in
behavior that will lead to arrest, not conviction. Arrest is an action taken by
police officers under authority of the state.197 These are some of the least
procedurally protected instances of contact with the criminal justice system.198

195

See Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, CORNELL
U. LIBR. 12–15 (May 30, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.09207.pdf (describing various meanings of
accuracy and equality from a statistical perspective); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out: Criminal Justice
Risk Assessment and the Myth of Race Neutrality (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing
various meanings of accuracy and equality from a legal perspective).
196 The same analysis applies to ethnic disparities prevalent in the criminal justice system as well.
197 “[T]he police arrest a suspect whenever they, on the basis of suspicion that he has committed a
criminal offense or violation, (1) take him into custody by handcuffing or otherwise depriving him of his
freedom; (2) transport him to a police station, jail, or detention facility; (3) process him by creating a
permanent record of the arrest, taking identifying information, including photographs, fingerprints, and the
like; and (4) detain him until either he is released or his arrest is subjected to judicial review.” Rachel A.
Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 311 (2016).
198 A police officer may arrest someone based upon probable cause to believe that a person committed a
crime. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). Probable cause provides a “relatively low threshold” for
police intervention. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 779 (2012)
(“[P]robable cause ensures only that there is a reason to arrest the individual, not that the arrest is a necessary
or effective means of enforcing the law or preventing disorder.”); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 809, 818 (2015). While less scrutinized criminal enforcement events also occur—like Terry stops or
traffic stops—arrests result in criminal records that can follow a defendant for life. Harmon, supra note 197, at
312 (“Unlike many other encounters with the police, a suspect who is arrested and booked faces practical,
reputational, and privacy consequences that persist whether or not he is subject to further legal proceedings.”).
See generally Jain, supra, at 820–25 (describing impact of arrest).
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Of the twelve million people arrested every year,199 many are not ultimately
convicted. Explanations abound for this—prosecutors may choose not to
pursue charges,200 evidence may not support the charge, prosecutors may not
secure convictions,201 and, most simply, the defendant may be innocent.202
Arrests occur disproportionately against minorities, and in particular,
against black men. 203 Black men come into contact with the criminal justice
system more frequently204 and from an earlier age.205 But more frequent
contact with the justice system does not necessarily mean higher risk to the
public. Much of this contact comes from heightened scrutiny, not necessarily
more criminal wrongdoing. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the context
of drug crimes, where police disproportionately arrest blacks even though
blacks use drugs at similar rates as other races.206 The decision to use arrests as
a predictive factor and event of interest thus lies in some other purpose than
public safety.
Actuarial risk tools rely on a number of other factors beyond contact with
the criminal justice system that also disproportionately disadvantage
communities of color. Popular risk tools rely on factors like education,
employment, parents with criminal history, and marital status—which may
disadvantage black defendants given cultural realities and structural barriers in

199

Crime in the United States 2012, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING: FBI (2012), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crimein-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested.
200 See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 128 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors can choose whether to accept police officers’
recommendations and pursue those charges.”).
201 See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579, 604–09 (2014) (explaining that juries
may refuse to convict a defendant); Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(showing that judges may dismiss prosecutions).
202 Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1680–84 (2010).
203 Blacks are arrested at higher rates than whites or Hispanics. See JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE
SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE 17–18 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
publications/Racial%20Disparities%20Report%20062515.pdf. Even disparities in convictions cannot explain
the disparity in arrests. Id. at 18–19. This is particularly true in the context of drug crimes, where African
Americans comprise 31% of those arrested for drug law violations despite making upon only 13% of the U.S.
population and using drugs at similar rates as other races. DRUG POLICY ALL., THE DRUG WAR, MASS
INCARCERATION AND RACE 1 (2016), http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA%20Fact%20Sheet_
Drug%20War%20Mass%20Incarceration%20and%20Race_%28Feb.%202016%29_0.pdf.
204 See DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 203.
205 See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 29–30 (1995).
206 See DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 203.
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society.207 Black and Latino applicants searching for a job without a criminal
record fare no better than white applicants just released from prison. One in
fifteen black children born today has an incarcerated parent, as compared to
one in 111 white children.208 Children of incarcerated parents tend to suffer
from learning and behavioral problems at higher rates than peers whose parents
are not incarcerated.209 Even without the reliance on criminal history, other
variables disproportionately affect racial minorities with such frequency that
tools relying on those factors will classify minorities as higher risk.
These realities combine to demonstrate that risk tools by design will more
frequently classify minorities as higher risk. Consider the ongoing debate
regarding COMPAS risk tools as an example. ProPublica recently conducted a
study on the use of commercially designed tools.210 There, journalists found
through statistical analysis that black defendants evaluated by COMPAS tools
were more likely to be incorrectly labeled as higher risk without committing a
future crime in the requisite time period, as compared to white defendants who
were more likely to be incorrectly labeled as lower risk but actually committed
crimes in the same time period.211 This disparity in classification could not be
explained by criminal history, gender, or age.212 In follow-up research, various
academics and COMPAS developer Northpointe assert that the tools are
racially neutral because black and white defendants classified as high risk were

207 Eaglin, supra note 31, at 214–18; Eaglin, May the Odds Be (Never) in Minorities’ Favor? Breaking
Down the Risk-Based Sentencing Divide, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/jessica-eaglin/may-the-odds-be-never-in-_b_5697651.html. Recently, two scholars
disputed the categorization of certain predictive factors as proxies for race. See Jennifer L. Skeem &
Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54
CRIMINOLOGY 680 (2016). These scholars asserted that, because certain factors like race, education, and
employment cannot alone predict recidivism in black people, these factors cannot be proxies. Id. at 704. Yet
this study misses my point—education and employment disadvantages predict recidivism as defined by the
tools, see id., and those factors disproportionately affect minorities. As the study suggests, lack of education or
presence of criminal history would equally result in white defendants and black defendants being classified as
higher risk. See Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra, at 704. The issue, as explained in the text above, is that blacks
experience these factors disproportionately. This is particularly true when it is combined with prior arrests as a
factor to estimate recidivism.
208 Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitutional Right to the Family
Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 81–82 (2011).
209 Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME &
JUST.: A REV. OF RES. 133, 135 (2008).
210 See Angwin et al., supra note 2.
211 Id.
212 Id.
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rearrested at equal rates.213 Even if the false positive rates were different, the
true positive rates were the same.214
The discrepancy between these assertions relate to conceptions of
fairness.215 It also relates to the construction of the tools. As explained in Part
I, risk tool developers often choose to estimate recidivism risk as chance of
arrest based upon factors like prior arrest. Using arrest as the measure of
recidivism makes it impossible for black defendants not to be classified as high
risk with more frequency given that arrest rates differ by race.216
If these are the known inputs—criminal history and social factors
disadvantaging minorities—and these are the known outcomes of the tools—
more frequently classifying black defendants as higher risk compared to white
defendants—the remaining question is why? Why do the tools use this
information to predict? Beyond the convenience argument addressed below,217
there are at least two interrelated explanations relating to race.
One explanation is unconscious bias. Developers unconsciously program
tools that disadvantage minorities by making design choices that reflect
socially accepted structural inequities in society.218 In other words, “oops.”
Professor Anupam Chander recently dismissed this possibility in his essay, The
Racist Algorithm, where he notes that “because much of societal discrimination
is subconscious or unconscious, it is less likely to be encoded into automated
algorithms than the human decisionmakers that the algorithms replace.”219 Yet,
as this Article demonstrates, the humans developing the tools are

213 Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to
“Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased
Against Blacks.”, 80 FED. PROB., Sept. 2016, at 38, 41; WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., NORTHPOINTE, INC.,
COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY (2016),
http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf.
214 See Flores et al., supra note 213; DIETERICH ET AL., supra note 213.
215 See Mayson, supra note 195; Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of
Risk Scores, CORNELL U. LIBR. 4 (Nov. 17, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf.
216 Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism
Prediction Instruments, CORNELL U. LIBR. (Feb. 28, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.00056.pdf ; Sam
Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased
Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not that Clear., WASH. POST, (Oct. 17, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-thanpropublicas.
217 See infra Section II.D.
218 Selection of predictive variables inevitably disadvantage different groups more. See Barocas & Selbst,
supra note 14, at 688.
219 Chander, supra note 28, at 1028.
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decisionmakers. Whether to predict arrests versus convictions, and whether to
include certain predictive factors to determine that outcome are choices that
developers make.220
That developers must explain their decisions internally provides little
solace for this threat.221 Why not? First, developers have their own set of
incentives that shape their decisions, and none of those incentives circle around
equality. Developers want to construct actuarial tools using cheap, accessible
data, even if the data reflects racial biases.222 This explains the decision to use
arrest data as both a predictor and an outcome. Second, developers are tasked
with creating risk tools that predict with accuracy. They are not tasked with
developing race-neutral tools.223 To the extent that equality flows from the
tool, it is a side effect and not a priority. Third, developers do not permit that
the internal explanations throughout the construction process be reviewable by
the public. Most developers select risk factors without the opportunity for
public review.224 Yet without the opportunity to review, there is reason to
believe their decisions will not further equality principles.
A second explanation follows from the first: developers subordinate the
quest for equality in pursuit of accuracy. If society could only have one—
equality or accuracy—which would it pick? Empirical debates currently
struggle with this question. A tool may accurately estimate risk and
consistently classify more minorities as higher risk even though they will not
engage in future criminal behavior. Whether society accepts that black
defendants will disproportionately bear the burden of additional supervision
flowing from actuarial risk assessments is a normative decision. More
consideration of this question is beyond the scope of this Article.225 The point
220

Except for machine learning tools, where developers do not pre-identify risk factors.
But see Chander, supra note 28, at 1029 (“Because of a programming process that requires both
writing down explicit instructions and documenting what particular code does, unconscious or subconscious
discrimination is less likely to manifest itself in computer programming than in human decisionmaking.”).
222 This may amount to “rational racism” as well. Rational racism occurs when developers rely upon more
simplified data because more granular data that would explain variations would be costlier or challenging to
use. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 14, at 690; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES,
AND STEREOTYPES (2003).
223 See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT 2, supra note 65, at 1 (restating the recidivism risk study’s goals and
nowhere representing an interest in racial inequities); see also NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 45, at 26 (stating
its goal to develop tools that predict recidivism). See generally supra Section II.A.
224 As a rare exception, consider Pennsylvania’s development of risk tools discussed infra Part III.
225 For what it is worth, the answer to this question is not as obvious as it might appear. The criminal
justice system may not be able to bear a decision to sacrifice equality to accuracy. Erin Murphy, Relative
Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 321–22 (2010) (arguing that the
221
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here is far more simple: to the extent risk assessment tools place equality and
accuracy at odds with one another, the public should have some input into
whether and how to resolve these dilemmas long before the tools have been
adopted in a jurisdiction. Input and accountability are necessary during the tool
construction process.
In summary, tool developers make decisions during the construction
process that impact a defendant’s opportunity to benefit from the use of risk
assessment tools at sentencing. If these tools are used in the criminal justice
system, developers’ choices and their effect on equality should be addressed
head on and in public.
C. The Purpose of Punishment
Judges must determine sentences that further any or all of the normative
purposes of punishment—including retribution or the utilitarian goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.226 These boil down to two
justifications: either the defendant needs punishment because he deserves it or
because it will benefit society at large.227 States ordinarily do not indicate a
particular theory that should guide sentencing.228 They simply state all the
goals and urge judges to sentence in pursuit of a purpose. Yet the normative
purposes of punishment set the criteria to determine if a sentence is
appropriate.229 These purposes also set the criteria to determine if a risk tool
provides “good” information for sentencing.
Of the myriad rationales for punishment that might underpin sentencing in
general, the incapacitation rationale most squarely justifies the use of
predictive evidence.230 In other words, sentencing should aim to prevent social
harm. In this sense, actuarial risk tools build upon numerous criminal justice
reforms adopted in recent decades—such as habitual offender sentencing
enhancements and mandatory minimum penalties—aimed to shape the justice
appearance of racial bias in familial DNA searches may undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system). The legitimacy of a system that perpetually incarcerates and even kills black men disproportionately
has been put into question by leading scholars and, more recently, the #BlackLivesMatter movement.
226 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
227 See id.
228 See RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM
(2013).
229 Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 10 (2006).
230 Retribution, as compared to the utilitarian goals, seeks to punish an individual based on moral desert
and the defendant’s previous wrongdoing. It looks to the past, while risk tools look to the future. Robinson,
supra note 35.
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system toward preventive detention.231 This rationale supports incapacitation
of a defendant for as long as she presents a risk of danger to society.
Yet current risk tools poorly vindicate that rationale. Advocates endorse
risk-based sentencing because these recidivism risk tools provide information
regarding whether a defendant poses a risk to society. Such information
appears valuable in determining a sentence that furthers incapacitation goals.
But the question that courts need to know in relation to incapacitation theory is
slightly different: what effect will a particular sentence have on the defendant’s
likelihood of threatening public safety in the future?232 This question engages a
deeper question about prevention, not simply prediction. Not one predictive
tool comes close to addressing this question.233 Current tools do not consider
the length of sentence as a variable on risk. Few tools even consider the
offense of conviction that led to sentencing. Currently, tools suggest the
probability of recidivism within a set time—usually one to three years—but
without any reference to how an actual sentence may affect the defendant’s
recidivism risk.
Acknowledging that these tools aim to advance preventive detention only
further illustrates the difficult normative judgments underlying use of the tools
at sentencing. As Professor Michael Tonry explains, “[N]ormative purposes
provide the theoretical criteria for deciding whether sentences imposed on
individual offenders are just or appropriate.”234 It also indicates what
information is pertinent to a sentencing determination. As such, it indicates
whether and what predictive tools should measure. These are not empirical
questions. As Professor Christopher Slobogin explained in advocating for a
preventive detention system, “the degree of risk necessary to authorize
intervention . . . are moral/legal questions that laypeople and legal
decisionmakers, not clinical experts, should decide.”235 As this Article
demonstrates, the very construction of the tool implicates the “moral/legal”
questions that Slobogin and others recognize in a shift towards preventive
detention. Tool developers are not equipped or situated to address these
questions. Only society can decide what tools should predict and why at
sentencing.
231

Id. at 1438.
See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 122–36; Starr, supra note 1, at 855–58.
233 See Sonja B. Starr, The New Profiling: Why Punishing Based on Poverty and Identity Is
Unconstitutional and Wrong, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 229, 233 (2015).
234 Tonry, supra note 229, at 11.
235 Slobogin, supra note 25, at 167.
232
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D. Developers’ Incentives
To complicate the normative judgments identified above, it is important to
note that tool developers have incentives in the tool-construction process that
diverge from the interests of society at large. Developers construct recidivism
risk tools with two sets of concerns in mind: available data and sufficiently
varied observations. These interests influence the assumptions and policy
decisions embedded in the tools such that tool construction may conflict with
or contradict existing sentencing law and policies.
Developers shape the basics of the tool at the outset of the design process
based upon available data. Whether data is already available, or how much
time and money it may cost to obtain data, will shape tool-construction
decisions. For example, because developers wanted to develop the ORAS
within three years, they chose to use arrests as the indicator of recidivism, and
only studied the likelihood of this event occurring within a year of the initial
observation.236 Using arrest data was simple, low cost, and easy to access. 237
Setting up the study within a short period of time also controlled upfront costs.
Consideration of these resource constraints limited the amount of data
collected (studying over one year as opposed to more), and shaped the
predictive questions that the tool would address. This example demonstrates a
broader principle applicable across tool creators—use available data where
possible to construct the risk tool.238
Developers need sufficiently varied observations in the data sets to
effectively predict specific outcomes. Prediction is challenging to achieve
unless a data set contains enough people who engage in the behavior that
developers wish to predict. For example, imagine a data set that contains only
forty-five people who actually committed murder in an eighteen-month period
out of 10,000 individuals observed. If a developer wishes to predict homicide,
it will be difficult to glean much meaning from the predictors identified in the
set.239 Additionally, the false-negative rate could be very high. If the tool
236

See LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 15.
See Jain, supra note 198, at 818 (stating that “arrest rates are relatively high, making arrests a valuable
source of data”); Murphy, supra note 44, at 510–11 (stating that criminal records are easily accessible for data
use).
238 See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT 2, supra note 65, at 1–2 (using data collected for sentencing commission
and arrest data to develop risk tool).
239 This example derives loosely from a proposed data set recently set forth by Dr. Richard Berk. See
BERK, supra note 41, at 4–5. The difficulty in predicting violent crime, particularly due to low base rates, is
well documented. See Markus Breitenbach et al., Creating Risk-Scores in Very Imbalanced Datasets:
237
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predicts no event of recidivism 98% of the time, it would be highly accurate;
however, if someone does commit homicide then the cost to society for the
false negative would be high as well, because public safety would be
compromised.
To address this concern, developers make choices regarding how to flatten
out the data set. In this example, developers may choose to predict something
else that will increase the base rate, such as all violent offenses or even all
arrests, regardless of the type of offense alleged. In other words, they choose
how to simplify the prediction question so that more individuals fit the criteria
necessary to achieve variety in the data set sufficient for study and analysis.
The decision to flatten out the data by changing the outcome of interest is
problematic because it reflects a normative judgment about what matters at
sentencing.240 Developers may manipulate the data by aggregating distinct
types of offenses to produce outcome-significant events of interest in the data
set. For example, the VRAG includes any criminal behavior, even if the
behavior did not result in an arrest or conviction.241 The ORAS, on the other
hand, uses arrests for any type of offense, including technical violations of
probation.242 Aggregated events have different criminal justice significance.
Someone who commits a misdemeanor or technical violation of probation does
not pose the same threat to society as someone who will commit a violent
crime. However, by flattening out the data to include both types of contact with
the criminal justice system as events of interest in a tool, data researchers can
easily increase the size and variety in their data set. This manipulation
facilitates creating more predictive models. But these events have varying
significance,243 and their occurrence may influence a judge’s ultimate sentence

Predicting Extremely Violent Crime Among Criminal Offenders Following Release from Prison, in RARE
ASSOCIATION RULE MINING AND KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY: TECHNOLOGIES FOR INFREQUENT AND CRITICAL
EVENT DETECTION 242 (Yun Sing Koh & Nathan Rountree eds., 2010) (noting that “events of interest” occur
in less than 20% of participants in violent recidivism studies). Although outside the context of adult recidivism
risk tools used at sentencing, the pretrial risk assessment tool in the ORAS system faced a similar problem—
too few defendants committed events of interest (failure to appear pretrial). There, Dr. Edward Latessa and his
team infused the underlying data set with information on defendants from out-of-state, in which failure to
appear was more prevalent. See LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 14.
240 As Professor Richard Berk explains, “[T]he choice of what to forecast is a blend of legal, political, and
technical concerns.” BERK, supra note 41, at 10.
241 See supra notes 89–93.
242 See supra note 94.
243 See supra notes 83–88.
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differently.244 Few tools parse out these distinctions with much clarity. The
ORAS creators recently developed a model within its original model that
predicts misdemeanor offenses specifically for this exact reason.245 Few other
tools have created similarly specific tools.
As a second example, developers rely on unadjudicated behavior—
meaning arrests—as an event of interest or a predictive factor given their
unique and diverging interests in data size and variety. Currently, predictive
tools rely heavily on criminal history events both as variables to predict
recidivism and as the events of interest that define recidivism.246 Tool creators
frequently include arrests, charges, and instances of contact with the criminal
justice system because they are available. Arrests provide a cheap, easy, and
accessible data set for researchers to pull information.247 Dr. Edward Latessa
and his team explicitly chose to use arrests as the recidivism event because the
data was readily available and the time frame for producing the tool was
short.248 The Pennsylvania tool uses arrests in part because that data is
available from the state database.249 Using arrests and other complaints about
potentially criminal behavior makes the predictive models easier to create
cheaply and quickly.
Yet the decision to rely on arrest data rather than convictions has
significant meaning at sentencing as well. While sentencing law traditionally
permits consideration of a wealth of information with very few limitations,
244 Take as an example recidivism based on parole violation. As the Marshall Project recently explained,
“[I]n the current era of criminal justice reform, states have differed in their attempts to incarcerate fewer
technical violators. Some have done nothing, while others are implementing a variety of less punitive sanctions
for parolees or capping the number of days they can be incarcerated for.” Eli Hager, At Least 61,000
Nationwide Are in Prison for Minor Parole Violations, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2017, 10:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/04/23/at-least-61-000-nationwide-are-in-prison-for-minor-paroleviolations#.UmaCqOQtq. For more discussion of these alternative sanctions, see Eaglin, supra note 37. The
point here is that recidivism risk for some specific events, like technical violations of parole, will not carry the
same significance at sentencing as others, like risk of violent assault.
245 Dr. Edward Latessa and his team of data scientists created a tool that predicts misdemeanor offenses
due to requests by judges for clarity and nuance in predictive tool outcomes. See LATESSA ET AL., supra note
56.
246 See supra Part I. For example, the LSI-R uses parole and probation revocations and COMPAS uses
“other” supervision violations. See Hamilton, supra note 57, at 98, 104. The Federal Post Conviction Risk
Assessment Scoring Guide, currently not used for sentencing but held out as a particularly accurate tool,
“[c]ount[s] all contact with law enforcement resulting from criminal conduct or status offenses (truancy,
curfew violations, run-away).” Id. at 104 n.145. It also “[c]ount[s] arrests and referrals to court for all offenses
(including traffic),” as derived from the official records. Id.
247 See Jain, supra note 198, at 818; Murphy, supra note 44, at 510–11.
248 See LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 15–16.
249 See INTERIM REPORT 2, supra note 65, at 1.
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states vary in where they draw the line on the unadjudicated conduct that may
be considered. There is a strong sentencing policy argument against using
unadjudicated conduct.250 Some states adhere to this perspective. Either by
legislation or by judicial decision, these states exclude some types of
unadjudicated behavior from consideration at sentencing. Two states that
participate in risk-based sentencing—Minnesota and Washington—preclude
the use of non-conviction offenses as sentencing considerations.251 Indiana and
North Carolina prohibit the use of acquittals at sentencing.252 Despite these
prohibitions, two of the four states permit risk-based sentencing and the use of
actuarial tools that do consider these factors.253 When used at sentencing, such
risk tools directly undermine the state’s sentencing policy based on toolconstruction decisions.
This Part illustrates that tool developers’ interests in data size and variety
shapes construction choices that relate to sentencing policy. These interests
shape how entities developing tools conclude the normative judgments
identified in the previous sections. The diverging interests further illustrate that
society, not the tool developers, must independently decide the normative
judgments embedded in tool construction.

250 For example, Professor Kevin Reitz argues that using unadjudicated conduct undermines the
procedural and substantive guarantees of the criminal justice system. See Reitz, supra note 110, at 548–53.
251 See id. at 535.
252 See id. at 533, 533 n.63.
253 Indiana developed the IRAS tool, but permits use of other risk assessment tools including the LSI-R at
sentencing. LSI-R uses prior arrests as a predictive factor at sentencing. See Hamilton, supra note 57, at 94
(explaining that the LSI-R uses prior convictions and prior arrests at sentencing). IRAS-CST uses arrests under
the age of eighteen. See UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, supra note 51, at 2–4. In Minnesota, supervision agencies use
risk assessment tools like the LSI-R in making sentencing/disposition recommendations. See MINN. DEP’T OF
CORR., STUDY OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN MINNESOTA: 2011 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 5 (Dec.
2010), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2013/mandated/130241.pdf. The Washington State Department of
Corrections developed an actuarial risk tool that considers convictions, not arrests. See WASH. STATE INST. FOR
PUB. POLICY, WASHINGTON’S OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’ STATIC RISK
INSTRUMENT 2 (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/977/Wsipp_Washingtons-OffenderAccountability-Act-Department-of-Corrections-Static-Risk-Instrument_Full-Report-Updated-October2008.pdf. North Carolina considered a risk tool for sentencing purposes, but chose not to endorse its use at
sentencing. N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CORRECTIONAL PROGRAM EVALUATIONS, 2000–2008 25 (2009), http://www.
nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/correctionalevaluation_0209.pdf.
The
Commission
endorsed the use of risk assessments at other discretionary stages leading up to or after sentencing, including
the development of “sentencing plans.” Id. at 15.
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III. TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY IN TOOL CONSTRUCTION
This Article demonstrates that the value of a recidivism risk tool for
sentencing is critically connected to key information about the tool’s
development, including the data set, the factors, the model, and the tool’s
translation into qualitative risk categories. These construction decisions
implicate larger normative questions best left for criminal justice experts and
the political process to resolve. Yet tool construction is obscure. Developers
may refuse to disclose some or all of the information discussed above, and
rarely will they engage in the larger questions at play when the tools are
applied to the criminal justice system. Even when they do, there is reason to
doubt that tool developers—whether a public or private entity—are well
positioned to address the normative questions implicated in tool construction.
As a solution, government entities and tool developers should adhere to
various accountability measures in the construction of actuarial risk tools.
Accountability here means more than simply ensuring that the tools do what
they say they do, as most computer science scholars use the term.254 To address
the threats identified in this Article, risk tools used for the administration of
criminal justice must reflect the values of the communities where the tools are
applied. This requires engagement with the construction of the tools at various
stages of production to ensure that the data-driven outcomes reflect legal and
social values when used in the criminal justice system.
The following sections expand upon this call for accountability in tool
construction. Section A disentangles accountability from transparency and
develops the two kinds of accountability literatures applicable to risk tools in
the criminal justice system. Data researchers call for accountability to ensure
that tools do what they say they do. Critics concerned about the fairness of risk
tools should shift toward demands of accountability as well—to ensure that the
tools accord with a community’s values. Section B offers a framework to
understand various levels of opacity in tool construction: transparency,
accessibility, and interpretability. It also suggests interventions necessary at
each level to promote the construction of democratically accountable
recidivism risk predictions.

254

See, e.g., Chander, supra note 28; Kroll et al., supra note 28.
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A. From Obscurity to Accountability
Obscurity in tool construction is a pressing problem. Many tool developers
refuse to disclose some or all of the key information critical to understanding
the value of the risk estimates produced by predictive risk tools.255 Unlike
humans, the tools provide no explanation for their results other than the
numerical outcomes translated into risk scores.256 This obscurity produces two
kinds of anxieties as tools expand into the administration of criminal justice:
do the tools do what they say they do, and are those tools fair? Recent
responses to the former concern—do the tools do what they say—call for
accountability in tool construction. To address the latter concern about fairness
built out in Part II of this Article requires shifting toward accountability as
well. To ensure fair construction of risk tools, government agencies and tool
developers should create democratic accountability measures that invite the
public to engage in the tool-construction and selection process.
The traditional response to obscurity is transparency, but transparency only
scratches the surface of the threats risk tools pose to the administration of
justice. The limits of transparency are best illustrated through example.
Imagine if all tool creators released the data that they collected to predict
recidivism. They may even explain why they collected the information as well.
This requirement would be beneficial for future innovation257 and, technically
speaking, would bring some transparency to the creation of risk tools.
However, to the judge considering how to weigh this information at
sentencing, the hard data would be useless. To the defendant classified as high
risk, the data would similarly mean nothing. Only entities capable of analyzing
the data glean benefit from this requirement, and few criminal justice actors or
members of the general public are thus situated. 258 Such a requirement could
have the opposite result of obscuring tool construction even while making it
technically transparent.259
255 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 2016) (discussing how COMPAS treats
information about specific factors used in the tool and the weight assigned to those factors as trade secrets, and
refuses to disclose them); see also Wexler, supra note 33 (describing claims of trade secrecy by developers of
actuarial risk tools).
256 See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful
Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (2017).
257 See Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535 (2014).
258 Resources are a serious impediment to the expansion of actuarial risk tools as it is.
259 This requirement could limit understanding of the tool without additional steps to give the outcomes
more meaning. The data could be valuable to the court and the defendant if the defense attorney can analyze
and test the information. See Wexler, supra note 33 (arguing that all information about machine tools used in
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Transparency alone does not provide insight as to whether the tool’s
outcomes provide valuable information for use at sentencing. For example,
does a tool use information prohibited from consideration at sentencing under
state law? Does the data set reflect individuals from the communities where the
tools are being used? Did tool developers include factors that will
disproportionately impact the risk scores of poor and minority defendants? If
so, which ones? Perhaps the better question is why? Are the cut-off points
located in line with public’s judgment about how much risk is the appropriate
amount to accept in society? We often do not know. Information about the data
set or even the weighting of various factors does not, on its face, provide
insight to these questions either. Yet answering these questions is critical to
understanding and giving value to the tool’s result.
To be sure, transparency has an essential place in ensuring fairness in
automated prediction tools, and data scholars often urge its expansion. 260 A
growing body of big-data scholarship, however, urges accountability rather
than simply transparency.261 While recognizing that accountability means
ensuring administrators “choose the approach that . . . works best for their
communities,”262 the focus is largely on ensuring that tools do not controvert
those goals through technology. Accountability measures, including the
development of additional computer programs to check system function, can
achieve this and more.263 This call for accountability has significance in the
criminal justice context as well, as it is critical that courts can rely on tools that
do what they say they do.264 Solutions include auditing the data collection
process and issuing training programs for courts and administrators to ensure
the proper application of the technique for sentencing.265
Yet in the context of criminal justice, accountability takes on a greater
meaning as well: do the actions of the government reflect the values of the

the criminal justice system should be transparent so that lawyers can educate the courts about their fallibility).
I do not suggest here that such interventions are not meaningful. Still, this Article aims to provide measures
that give risk assessments meaning for the broader public. This meaning complements and precedes
individualized interjections.
260 See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 15; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 15, at 6–8; Kroll et al., supra note
28.
261 See Chander, supra note 28; Kroll et al., supra note 28.
262 Ferguson, supra note 12, at 58; see also Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1503, 1533 (2013).
263 See Kroll et al., supra note 28.
264 See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 12.
265 Id. (discussing implementation problems in the policing context).
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people? In the context of actuarial risk tools, do the risk estimates reflect
whether and how society wants to assess a defendant’s risk level at sentencing?
Such accountability varies from the kind called for by data scholars. A
predictive tool could estimate a defendant’s level of risk just as it says it does
without technically considering race or other impermissible factors, but
nevertheless the result is illegitimate because it frustrates societal values of
accuracy or equality in the criminal justice system. While one could ask an
engineer or a developer about how the tool works, that developer’s value
judgment may not be consistent with the community where the tool is being
applied. The community of application is the relevant metric by which to
measure recidivism risk. Validity studies provide no insight as to that question.
At times, bureaucratic officials will not be able to do so either.266 Only the
communities affected by the tools can voice those values. When automated
predictive tools are applied in the administration of criminal justice, nothing
less than democratically accountable recidivism risk predictions should suffice.
Democratic participation in the construction of actuarial risk tools is
essential when the tools are developed to facilitate administering criminal
justice. Risk tools represent a form of evidence envisioned to inform criminal
justice actors about the defendant’s risk level in relation to society at large. At
times, the information is produced with the sanction of the state, like when the
state works with the developers to construct the tool.267 More often, however,
the tools are developed by private entities and adopted by jurisdictions with
limited opportunity for expert input and localized feedback.268 Yet constructing
recidivism risk is not an objective endeavor; rather, it is laced with “profound
policy questions that must be resolved in democratically accountable ways.”269
Who gets to make those decisions and when are critical to determining whether
that information accurately reflects the values of the community of application.
Lawmakers and policymakers should create interventions that pierce the
perceived objectivity of risk tools and facilitate engagement with the
underlying normative judgments implicated through construction. Such
interventions, including some suggestions discussed below, are critical to
ensuring that normative choices embedded in the tools reflect society’s
judgments about what counts for recidivism risk at sentencing, how, and why.
266

See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911
(2006) (describing the tension between bureaucratic “insiders” like judges, police, and prosecutors versus
“outsiders” like crime victims, bystanders, and the general public).
267 See supra notes 47–49.
268 See supra notes 44–46.
269 Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1836 (2015).
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There are costs to infusing the tool-construction process with criminal
justice expertise and political process accountability. To start, it will slow the
process of developing risk tools. This means fewer tools will become available
in the foreseeable future. That is not necessarily a bad thing, as the tools are
developing without much caution. The criminal justice system has survived a
long time without predictive tools. Slowing down creation and adoption of
tools can promote reflection about their construction and use. It can also
prompt society to grapple with the underlying normative challenges that the
tools present.
Infusing this kind of accountability into the construction of recidivism risk
tools will present implementation challenges. How can developers solicit the
requisite input in accountable ways? There are a variety of approaches, some
of which states and local jurisdictions have already adopted. As one example,
public notice and comment on normative decisions throughout the
development process would resolve many of the issues raised here.270
Requiring jurisdictions to hold public hearings and vote on the selection of
various risk tools or specific features of a risk tool is another option. Creating
legislation that intervenes with the construction of risk tools, for example
defining recidivism risk for predictive tools or preventing the transfer of public
data to private ownership, is another possibility. Future research can address
the implementation problem in more detail. The point here is to emphasize that
measures are necessary to infuse accountability into the construction process.
Likely the biggest opposition to this approach lies in concern over
accuracy. Opponents may suggest that infusing accountability into the
construction of risk tools could undermine the predictive accuracy of the tools’
results. In one sense it may, as the tools may not be constructed as developers
wish them to be. On the other hand, if the tools produce more fair and accurate
information about what risk means in society, then the tools better fulfill their
promise to inform criminal justice decision makers about the defendants in
relation to their communities. If pursuing this kind of accuracy is a cost, it is
well worth incurring to ensure the quality of the information used to administer
justice.

270 For more on the implementation of a notice-and-comment process as applied to criminal justice
policymaking, see Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (2012).
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The benefits to this approach are high as well. The criminal justice system
is already opaque to most laypeople entering or observing it.271 Risk tools
threaten to make the criminal justice system even more opaque, as the
defendant, the judge, and the general public may not understand why someone
is considered to have a low, medium, or high risk of recidivism.272 Shifting
normative judgments about tool construction toward the public arena could
make society more aware of how the system works. It may increase the
system’s legitimacy in the public’s eye. At the very least, it will produce more
clarity about what the recidivism risk estimates mean.
B. Constructing Democratically Accountable Risk
Infusing criminal justice expertise and political process accountability into
the construction of actuarial risk tools requires a framework to understand the
existing levels of opacity that people need to break through to facilitate
meaningful participation. This section provides that framework and suggests
interventions at each level.
There are three levels of opacity in the construction of recidivism risk
tools.273 The first level is transparency. Although this Article urges a shift
toward accountability, transparency about the tool’s design and its use are
necessary components. The second level of opacity refers to the issue of
accessibility. The communities considering a tool must understand the tools
enough to engage with the normative construction choices through the political
process. Third, and finally, is the matter of interpretability. Why a tool
produces the results that it does and the way its results will be used is critical to
271 See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34–38 (2012) (describing the opacity
of the criminal justice system); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014) (describing the opacity of the criminal justice system to those who attend
hearings).
272 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 774 (Wis. 2016) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (noting the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s “lack of understanding” as a “significant problem” to understanding a risk
assessment tool); Brief for the Public Defender of Indiana as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
Malenchik v. Indiana, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010) (No. 79S02-0908-CR-365) (noting that counsel for a
convicted person will have to “ferret[] out” information about what high risk means for a tool and what it
means in the context of setting sentences).
273 This framework draws upon the insightful framework proposed by Professor Jenna Burrell to clarify
the layers of opacity in machine learning algorithms. See Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks”:
Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 1. Here, I
use the terminology of Burrell’s framework, but in service to a unique and largely ignored aim: to engage the
public in the normative debates about the construction of risk assessment tools used at sentencing. This
framework has the benefit of applying to current non-machine learning tools at sentencing and potentially
applying to future machine learning tools as well.
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understanding construction choices. Each level triggers different questions
about the tools and the justice system. The purpose here is to identify the issues
in hopes that future research will pursue solutions as predictive tools continue
to expand in the administration of criminal justice. Still, at various points this
Article provides examples from different states and jurisdictions that have
addressed these questions head on.
1. Transparency Measures
Transparency is a necessary step to accountability.274 Without placing the
matter of tool construction in the public spotlight, it would be impossible for a
community to engage with the underlying normative judgments implicated
throughout the process. Transparency in this context has two separate
meanings to ensure democratically accountable risk estimates and temper the
threats to sentencing law and policy identified in this Article.
Tool Developers. For tool developers, some transparency is necessary to
ensure that localized criminal justice experts can provide input regarding the
construction and adoption of risk tools in a jurisdiction. For example,
information about the specific origin of the data set underlying a tool is an
important disclosure to determine the value of a tool. In addition, the selection
of risk factors should be disclosed to ensure that a tool does not contradict the
state’s existing sentencing law and policy. This information need not include
public release of the tool’s algorithm. However, even these minimal
disclosures go beyond what many developers currently provide.
Tool creators, particularly private entities, face strong disincentives from
sharing information about normative policy choices made during the toolconstruction process. There is little incentive to disclose data set choices given
the emphasis on validity studies as the indicator of tool quality.275 There is no
economic incentive to disclose these choices either.276 Competition amongst
tool creators to develop commercially viable risk assessment tools encourages
developers to remain vague about the subjective judgments embedded in their
tools. Disclosing specific information about tool-construction choices may lead
a consumer to perceive the underlying data set as methodologically weak or
274 Zarsky, supra note 262, at 1533–34 (“Transparency is an essential tool for facilitating accountability
because it subjects politicians and bureaucrats to the public spotlight.”).
275 See supra note 193. Trade secrecy creates another disincentive. For more discussion, see infra notes
292–293.
276 See Mattioli, supra note 257.
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unsound, and ultimately seek out another product.277 One can imagine a
competitor exploiting any weaknesses disclosed and using that to persuade a
state or specific jurisdiction toward adoption of its alternative tool.278 Even
when products are soundly developed, detailed disclosure of tool design
permits replication of technique, thus allowing new competitors into a
developing market.279
These disincentives explain the systemic difficulty in obtaining information
about the design, development, and evaluation of privately created risk
assessment tools used in the criminal justice system. In 2015, University of
Maryland School of Journalism Professor Nicholas Diakopoulos undertook a
semester-long project to obtain “documents, mathematical descriptions, data,
validation assessments, contracts, and source code” related to actuarial risk
assessment tools used in the fifty states for any criminal justice determination,
including parole, probation, bail, or sentencing.280 After submitting formal
requests to the government agencies using these tools, few states provided
actual insight. As Professor Diakopoulos explains, nine states refused the
request because a private company owned the information.281 In essence, the
companies treat such design information as trade secrets protected by
intellectual property laws.282 States that entered into private contracts with
nonprofit organizations similarly refused to release information about tool
design because contractual provisions prevented disclosure.283

277 See id. at 549; Murphy, supra note 44, at 536 (explaining private sector industries’ incentive to market
their tools).
278 See Mattioli, supra note 257, at 549.
279 As Professor Michael Mattioli notes, “[M]ost big data products cannot be reverse-engineered to reveal
the processes that went into their creation” because it is near impossible to “guess the various techniques and
judgments that go into processing a dataset.” Id. at 573, 573 n.171. Given this reality, tool creators’ disclosure
of tool design is the only way to understand the subjective policy choices embedded in the tool. This is the
only way for an outsider to challenge the reliability of the underlying data set, too.
280 See Nicholas Diakopoulos, We Need to Know the Algorithms the Government Uses to Make Important
Decisions About Us, CONVERSATION (May 23, 2016, 8:48 PM), http://theconversation.com/we-need-to-knowthe-algorithms-the-government-uses-to-make-important-decisions-about-us-57869?utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20May%2023%202016%20-%204912&utm_
content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20May%2023%202016%20-%204912+CID_
efe310bf05b2dc19249223110c254baf&utm_source=campaign_monitor_us&utm_term=he%20writes.
281 Id.
282 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 2016) (“Northpointe, Inc. . . . considers
COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade secret.”). For more discussion on the intersection of trade
secrecy laws and big data, see, for example, PASQUALE, supra note 15, at 12–14; Mattioli, supra note 257, at
550–56. For a discussion of its application in the criminal justice context, see generally Wexler, supra note 33.
283 For example, Kentucky refused to disclose information in response to the journalist’s request for this
reason. See Diakopoulos, supra note 280.
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Public entities developing risk tools also face disincentives that support
opacity in tool creation. Disclosing elements of a predictive model may
encourage strategic behavior by individuals who recognize themselves as low
risk.284 It may be onerous and overly technical, thus providing little insight into
the policy decisions at all.285 Additionally, the result of such disclosures may
be a less precise tool. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing’s
experience in tool development illustrates this dilemma. During its study, the
Commission found that the location from which defendants originate was a
strong predictor of recidivism.286 Data researchers initially decided to include
this measure in the tool.287 It was only after public backlash against this
predictive factor that tool creators pulled that information from the predictive
model.288 Tool creators perceived this decision as undermining the tools’
ability to predict accurately.289 As such, the public intervention conflicted with
the interests of the state agency.290
In response to these disincentives, state or local government bodies could
create statutes or ordinances that require specific disclosures if the tools are
used for the administration of criminal justice. These requirements may run up
against companies that seek to protect risk-tool-construction information as
commercially valuable, and thus a trade secret that cannot be disclosed.
Whether such claims have merit in the criminal justice context is a matter of
debate.291 Still, preemptory transparency requirements can avoid dilemmas that
trade secret claims may present. Developers can disclose most toolconstruction choices without disclosing the actual algorithm to the public.292
284

See Kroll et al., supra note 28, at 658.
See id. at 659–60
286 INTERIM REPORT 3, supra note 139, at 6.
287 See id.
288 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, PROPOSALS PUBLISHED IN PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN: ANNEX B (2017),
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/proposed-for-public-comment-sentence-risk-assessment-instrument/annexb/view.
289 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT: SPECIAL REPORT: IMPACT OF
REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 1 (2015), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-andevaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-ii-reports/special-report-impact-of-removing-demographicfactors/view.
290 The agency actually recommended that the Commission keep all demographic factors, including
county of origin. Id. Public pressure explains the decision to ultimately remove the factor. See infra Section
III.B.
291 See, e.g., David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure,
59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 140 (2007) (questioning the applicability of trade secrecy when private companies
operate in public infrastructures); Wexler, supra note 33 (demonstrating the uncertain application of trade
secrecy in the criminal context).
292 See Selbst, supra note 66.
285
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Moreover, a jurisdiction can demand the information upfront, before deciding
whether to adopt a tool.293 The decision not to disclose specific information
should be available to the public. That way, a jurisdiction can choose not to
adopt a tool that refuses to meet its disclosure requirements.
Criminal Justice Actors. For criminal justice actors, transparency requires
visibility and specificity about the adoption of risk-based sentencing practices.
Legislators mandate use of these tools in numerous jurisdictions. To name a
few, the Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia legislatures have
concluded that, at some point in the sentencing process, recidivism risk tools
must be considered.294 Even when use of a risk tool is not required, legislatures
in several states have encouraged their use directly through statute. For
example, the Washington State legislature encourages consideration of
recidivism risk tools at sentencing if available.295 Similarly, Louisiana permits
the use of a validated risk-and-needs tool at sentencing for eligible
defendants.296 Some legislatures indirectly encourage use of actuarial risk tools
through financial incentives as well. For example, the Illinois Crime Reduction
Act of 2009 provided funding for the award of grants to counties that created
standard plans to reduce prison commitments by 25%.297 Several of these
programs require use of LSI-R or another risk assessment tool to select

293

See Kroll et al., supra note 28, at 665–69 (suggesting methods for developers to make sensitive
information available upfront via technology for later disclosure).
294 See ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. § 6-201.01(J)(3) (Westlaw through 2017) (“For all probation eligible
cases, presentence reports shall . . . contain case information related to criminogenic risk and needs as
documented by the standardized risk assessment and other file and collateral information.”); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-2517(1) (West Supp. 2015) (“If the court orders a presentence investigation to be conducted, the
investigation report shall include current recidivism rates for . . . [specified offenders].”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.007(3) (West Supp. 2016) (“Sentencing judges shall consider . . . the results of a defendant’s risks and
needs assessment included in the presentence investigation . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.114(A)(1)–
(3) (West Supp. 2017) (“The department of rehabilitation and correction shall select a single validated risk
assessment tool for adult offenders. This assessment tool shall be used . . . [for sentencing or another purpose]
. . . .”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 988.18(B) (West Supp. 2011) (requiring any felony offenders considered
for community punishment to receive assessment under the LSI or “another assessment and evaluation
instrument designed to predict risk to recidivate approved by the Department of Corrections”); 42 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2154.7(a) (West Supp. 2017) (“The commission shall adopt a sentence risk
assessment instrument for the sentencing court to use to help determine the appropriate sentence . . . .”).
295 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.500(1) (West Supp. 2015) (declaring that the court “may order
the department to complete a risk assessment report,” and “[i]f available before sentencing, the report shall be
provided to the court”).
296 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:326(A) (2015) (stating that criminal courts “may use a single presentence
investigation validated risk and needs assessment tool”).
297 See Illinois Crime Reduction Act of 2009, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 190/20 (West Supp. 2016).
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defendants eligible for diversion.298 Policy advocates like the Justice
Reinvestment Initiative and the National Institute of Corrections are attributed
with spreading the use of risk assessment tools at sentencing across the states
as well.299
Yet most states engaging in risk-based sentencing do not specify which
tools can be used. The American Law Institute calls upon sentencing
commissions to develop risk tools for sentencing.300 As noted above, most
states do not develop their own risk tools.301 More often, legislatures are silent
on how to select a risk tool, leaving that determination to other criminal justice
actors in specific jurisdictions. For example, correctional departments often de
facto determine which risk tools to use at sentencing in some states because the
courts just use whichever tools are already in use in the jurisdiction.302
Criminal justice actors should transparently disclose the specific tools
adopted in a jurisdiction and seek community input on that decision if it
chooses to engage in risk-based sentencing. A jurisdiction could specify a tool
for use through legislation. Along these lines, the Virginia legislature serves as
an example because it directed the state sentencing commission to develop a
risk assessment tool.303 A jurisdiction could pursue the notice-and-comment
process before adopting a particular tool. In Pennsylvania, the state’s
sentencing commission sought public comment about the construction of the
actuarial risk tool after the state legislature mandated its creation.304 It provided
public information throughout the tool-construction process, from the
development of the statistical model to the construction of the tool.305 These
steps invited democratic participation in some of the normative judgments
embedded in the resulting tool. For example, a group of citizens created a risk

298

See Adult Redeploy Illinois, WILL COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER (2013), http://www.
willcountypublicdefender.com/resources/the-court-process/adult-redeploy-illinois-ari.
299 See CASEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 37–38; Eaglin, supra note 37, at 609–10 (noting the Justice
Reinvestment Initiative’s endorsement of using risk and needs assessments at sentencing); Klingele, supra
note 1, at 566 (attributing to the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, the National Institute of Corrections, and state
and local initiatives a critical role in expansion of risk assessment tools at sentencing).
300 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2 2011).
301 See supra notes 45–52; see also, e.g., 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 2154.7 (West Supp. 2017)
(sentencing commission making choice).
302 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.114 (West Supp. 2017) (corrections department making
choice); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 988.18(B) (West Supp. 2011) (corrections department making choice).
303 VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803 (West 2013).
304 See PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, supra note 288.
305 See id.
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assessment task force to comment on and track the development of the state’s
risk tool.306
Future scholarship should consider how to infuse more transparency into
the construction and adoption of actuarial risk tools across the country. The
point here is simply that criminal justice actors and tool developers have an
obligation to provide enough transparency about tool construction and
selection to facilitate accountability regarding the tool’s adoption.
2. Accessibility Measures
The public cannot engage with tool construction without information to
help give normative choices meaning. Recidivism risk prediction is, on its
face, largely inaccessible to the public. Accessibility demands that those who
construct the tools and those who use the tools understand the impact of the
estimates in application so as to better inform determinations of whether and
how to construct the tools. This demand has intersecting meanings for tool
developers and criminal justice actors as well, depending on the measure of
intervention.
Defining Recidivism and Inputs. Jurisdictions interested in pursuing the use
of actuarial risk tools at sentencing should invite criminal justice expertise and
community input regarding the definition of recidivism and whether various
factors should be eliminated from tool consideration as a matter of policy. A
state agency could publicize options to define recidivism for sentencing or
indicate alternative tools that define recidivism differently for public input
regarding tool selection. Information about the implications of each recidivism
definition should be produced for public consideration.307 Similar information
should be produced regarding the risk factors a tool considers. Criminal justice
experts and the jurisdictions where tools may be applied can then use that
information to access the debate about whether, when, and how to engage in
recidivism risk prediction at sentencing.

306 See Marni Jo Snyder, Attorney, Testimony on Behalf of the Risk Assessment Task Force (May 23,
2017), http://www.pahouse.com/files/Documents/2017-05-25_100857__Testimony%20before%20Sentencing
%20Commission.pdf.
307 This intervention aligns with calls to critically engage with the construction of actuarial risk tools in
other criminal justice contexts like pretrial bail detention. See Gouldin, supra note 166 (proposing a study on
alternative definitions of flight risk that are more precise to the judicial concerns of pretrial detention
determinations).
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These interventions can have meaningful results in preventing the
construction of tools that are inconsistent with a community’s values. For
example, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing attempted to use
neighborhoods as a predictive factor in its risk assessment tool.308 Public
critique of that factor led the Commission to conduct a study demonstrating the
impact of using that factor in a risk tool.309 It also led to exclusion of county of
origin as a predictive factor in the proposed tool.310 Other factors that
disproportionately affect members of particular communities may also be
excluded if developers systematically disclose the specific factors used for
prediction.
Recidivism Risk Classifications. Regarding the classification of various risk
estimates into specific risk categories, input from criminal justice experts and
political process engagement are already feasible. Tool developers currently
provide opportunities for criminal justice actors to decide the placement of cutoff points and to allocate the costs of classification errors. Criminal justice
actors inconsistently take that action.
Government agencies should always decide the cut-off points. In some
instances, agencies offer guidance to developers on how to categorize
defendants’ risk levels. For example, Virginia’s legislature provided insight on
how many low-level offenders it wanted the risk tool to recommend for
diversion (the lowest 25%) through legislation.311 The Virginia Sentencing
Commission then used deciles to group cases of a normative sample into risk
bins.312 In other words, it chose cut-off points based on the number outcome,
and subjectively chose how much of the sample population should fit into each
category. Entities developing tools are quite receptive to guidance on this
issue.313

308

PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, supra note 289, at 1.
Id. (citing Starr, supra note 32) (noting Starr’s article as a motivation to study the impact of
demographic factors on the proposed risk tool).
310 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, supra note 288 (predictive factors include age, gender, prior arrest, prior
arrest offense type, current conviction offense type, multiple current convictions, prior record score, and prior
juvenile adjudication).
311 Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 47.
312 See VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM’N, ASSESSING RISK AMONG SEX OFFENDERS IN VIRGINIA 92 (Jan.
2001), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/sex_off_report.pdf (explaining that the cut-off point is twenty-eight
points).
313 See, e.g., Berk, supra note 189, at 1079 (explaining that stakeholders are receptive to selecting cost
ratios in context of risk tools used at parole).
309
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Tool developers should not provide default cut-off points. Some developers
currently offer automatic default cut-off points for government agencies that
do not want to make these decisions. For example, developers of the ORAS
tools introduced cut-off points based on their own analysis of the data.314
Northpointe offers the tool with cut-off points introduced already, although it
gives state actors a choice to tinker with this aspect of tool design. If
Northpointe introduces the cut-offs, it uses a separate algorithm to divide the
sample into decile groups then accorded a risk level.315 This option should be
eliminated. How developers would choose to categorize defendants will be
influenced by their own sets of interests. These interests are not necessarily
representative of the values of a jurisdiction using a tool.
Governmental entities must engage the communities affected by the tools
in this decision to ensure tools reflect normative policy judgments in accessible
ways. For example, government agencies could issue statements explaining
where they would place cut-off points and why before deciding to adopt a tool
for risk-based sentencing. Such statements would facilitate informed political
process engagement with that decision.
Outputs. For criminal justice actors and the public to engage with the tools,
developers should produce information that facilitates accessibility as well.
Tool developers should be forthcoming about the outputs a tool produces to
facilitate public accountability measures.316 For example, what percentage of
defendants classified as high risk actually commit a crime in the future? What
is the racial and ethnic breakdown of the risk classifications? What kind of
socioeconomic impact does a tool-construction decision have?317 This
information is not easily accessible, but it is necessary to ensure toolconstruction decisions reflect a community’s values.
While tool developers have little incentive to disclose information
voluntarily,318 lawmakers could require that developers produce and publish
impact studies as a condition for tool adoption in their jurisdiction. State
314

LATESSA ET AL., supra note 63, at 17.
Where possible, each group would have approximately equal-sized numbers of offenders. See
NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 45, at 8.
316 See Chander, supra note 28, at 1039 (“Instead of transparency in the design of the algorithm, what we
need is a transparency of inputs and outputs.”).
317 See generally Starr, supra note 1 (noting the constitutional implications of risk tools due to
socioeconomic impact). Information for a particular jurisdiction could be valuable before the public provides
input on whether to use the tools at sentencing or in some other criminal justice context.
318 See supra Section II.D.
315
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sentencing commissions could produce the information as well through impact
statements before tool adoption. Such aggregate information would likely
engage public discourse.319 One need only look to the debate spurred by the
ProPublica study on race and risk assessments to demonstrate the point.320
With the necessary information and opportunity, the public can meaningfully
engage in the debate about whether and how tools should produce information
for sentencing.
In summary, tool developers and criminal justice actors have an obligation
to make recidivism risk construction choices accessible. Widespread and
targeted educational efforts are necessary to make the public more
knowledgeable about how recidivism risk construction decisions will affect
their communities.321 The meaning of various decisions must be clear so that
expert and lay members of the community can provide valuable feedback on
how to develop a tool used for the administration of criminal justice in its
jurisdiction.
3. Interpretability Measures
Those using the tools must be able to interpret the results as well.
Interpretability refers to the “why” questions. Why did a tool produce the
results that it did? More importantly, why does actuarial risk assessment fit
into the administration of criminal justice, and where? Again, these questions
have different meanings for tool developers and criminal justice actors.
Statistical Modeling. As noted above, there are a variety of statistical
models that can be adopted to predict recidivism risk. Most tools currently use
traditional regression models, but machine learning methods are on the
horizon.322 Risk tools using this modeling create difficult interpretability
issues, as the developers creating the tools cannot explain what factors a tool
uses to predict recidivism risk.323 The quickly evolving methods of prediction
only further illustrate the need for transparency and accessibility measures that
319 As an example, a Pennsylvania Risk Assessment Task Force now calls upon the Sentencing
Commission to publish results concerning the racial impact of tools before adoption of the proposed risk
assessment. See Snyder, supra note 306.
320 See supra Section II.B, notes 210–214.
321 See Burrell, supra note 273, at 4.
322 See supra notes 41–43.
323 See Chander, supra note 28, at 1040 (“[I]n the era of self-enhancing algorithms, the algorithm’s human
designers may not fully understand . . . what some of their algorithms do.”); supra notes 41–42 and
accompanying text (describing machine based learning methods).
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invite public engagement with tool construction. Even as the methods of
prediction change, the underlying normative judgments regarding accuracy,
equality, and purpose of punishment will persist. Whether these types of
models are appropriate for tools used at sentencing is an open question that
future research promises to address.
The Purpose of Punishment. The long-debated question of why we punish
is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that scholars make sound
arguments in favor of each purpose. Unfortunately, most states choose not to
select a particular purpose, instead leaving it to individual judges to select a
guiding theory to justify a particular sentence. The wisdom of this decision is
debated.
Yet insight on the purpose a tool seeks to further in application is necessary
for valuable input regarding tool construction. Even if a jurisdiction does not
select one guiding purpose of punishment, it should invite input and announce
which of the primary purposes a risk tool should further. This would occur
before soliciting public input regarding selecting or adopting a tool, which
would better inform their input on later construction decisions.
This determination could inform and shape decisions about tool
construction and adoption. For example, if a jurisdiction seeks a tool meant for
rehabilitation, developers should offer only tools designed to identify particular
risks that require interventions available at sentencing in that jurisdiction. If
deterrence is the guiding purpose, developers should offer tools that address
how much supervision or incarceration would reduce the likelihood of future
criminal behavior in that jurisdiction. If these tools are not available or
applicable, then the jurisdiction should not pursue risk-based sentencing
further.
If a jurisdiction chooses to pursue a risk tool that furthers incapacitation—
as many would324—this would inform various tool-construction decisions as
well. Tools could not be described as a solution to reduce mass incarceration,
which may temper some enthusiasm for the reform. Rather, the tools would be
described as a mechanism to ferret out anyone who poses a risk to society for
the purpose of additional detention or supervision. That aim would further
clarify the normative judgments for public input throughout the tool-

324 See Eaglin, supra note 31, at 222–24 (noting that criminal justice reforms are often motivated by a
desire for total incapacitation).
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construction or tool-adoption process. For example, it would influence where a
jurisdiction locates the cut-off points between risk categories.325
Other benefits could flow from this interpretability measure as well.
Announcing the tool’s purpose could prevent a one-size-fits-all approach to
risk assessment tools at sentencing. Because sentencing presents unique
limitations regarding the factors that can be considered to determine
punishment, risk tools in this context may be very different from those used at
other points in the justice system. In line with these determinations, a
jurisdiction should prohibit the application of risk tools designed for one
purpose to be used for another. Additionally, this announcement could
motivate a broader discourse about the purposes sentencing should pursue.
CONCLUSION
Risk-based sentencing seeks to infuse data-driven technology into the
determination of punishment through the introduction of actuarial estimates of
a defendant’s recidivism risk. Although conceived as objective and helpful
information, constructing an actuarial risk tool raises longstanding questions
about accuracy, equality, and the purpose of punishment that need to be
addressed. This Article examines the tool-construction process to bring forth
the normative judgments embedded in the tools’ development. These
judgments concern important values at sentencing too complex and contested
to leave in the hands of tool developers alone. This Article calls for democratic
accountability measures to address threats that risk-tool construction presents
at sentencing. It proposes measures to ensure that a tool’s results reflect values
consistent with those of the community adopting that tool.
In many ways, this Article raises more questions than answers. How do we
balance innovation and accountability? What do courts do with the information
produced by risk tools now without necessary measures of accountability?326
Given the opacity of the judgments entrenched in these tools, should we move
in the direction of big-data criminal justice at all? The answers to these
questions are unclear, and deserve more discussion in scholarship and the
public discourse. This Article recognizes that the answers to these

325
326

2018).

See also Mayson, supra note 1.
See Jessica M. Eaglin, Technological Evidence and Judicial Sentencing Discretion (forthcoming
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determinations will not only affect whether courts use the predictive risk tools,
but how those tools are constructed.
One point, however, is clear. More caution and nuance is necessary in
approaching the use of recidivism risk tools in the administration of criminal
justice. Indeed, former Attorney General Eric Holder expressed concern and
urged caution in the use of risk assessment tools at sentencing more than two
years ago.327 Although measured in his call, he was criticized harshly.328 This
Article echoes some of the concerns he raised, including the effect risk tools
may have on equality at sentencing. It calls for tool developers and criminal
justice actors to facilitate more public engagement with that ongoing debate.

327

Holder, supra note 32.
See, e.g., Judge Richard George Kopf, Like the Ostrich that Buries Its Head in the Sand, Mr. Holder Is
Wrong about Data-Driven Sentencing, HERCULES AND THE UMPIRE (Aug. 10, 2014), https://
herculesandtheumpire.com/2014/08/10/like-the-ostrich-that-buries-its-head-in-the-sand-mr-holder-is-wrongabout-data-driven-sentencing (criticizing former Attorney General Eric Holder’s critique of risk-based
sentencing); Sheldon Whitehouse, Letter to the Editor, Useful Tools in Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/opinion/useful-tools-in-sentencing.html (arguing that risk
assessment tools play an important role in the administration of criminal justice).
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